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Abstract—We furnish a procedure based on universal hash
families (UHFs) that can convert an error correcting coding
scheme (ECC) of rate R into a semantically secure wiretap coding
scheme of rate R − ξ where ξ is a parameter derived from the
eavesdropper’s point-to-point channel. This conversion is shown
to be polynomial time efficient with block length and is applicable
to any channel, i.e., both discrete and continuous channels. When
an ECC is chosen, our procedure induces a wiretap coding
scheme that is concrete and efficient as long as the ECC is also
such. To prove this induced wiretap coding scheme is semantically
secure, we have constructed bounds on the information leaked
to the eavesdropper. Our construction is an upgrade of bounds
from recent literature: the novelty here being that our leakage
bounds hold for any message distribution. Indeed, our wiretap
procedure using UHFs and our characterization of its semantic
leakage is the first main contribution of this work.
The other main contribution of this work is as follows. We ap-
ply the aforementioned procedure to a variety of wiretap channels
in order to show the procedure’s efficacy, and as a result of such
applications, we mirror existing results from literature regarding
achievable semantically secure rates. More notably, in some cases
our results establish new achievable semantically secure rates.
For DMC wiretap channels and No-CSIT (instantaneous channel
state information at the transmitter) fast fading wiretap channels,
we show how our wiretap scheme can achieve the secrecy capacity
in certain cases, but more generally, can always achieve a non-
negative rate of R−CE under semantic security where R is the
rate of the ECC on the main channel and CE is the capacity
of the eavesdropper’s point-to-point channel. On partial CSIT
fast fading wiretap channels, we show that our wiretap coding
scheme can achieve the best known secure achievable rates from
literature, even under semantic security. On full CSIT fast fading
wiretap channels, we show that our wiretap coding scheme can
achieve the secrecy capacity. On AWGN wiretap channels, using
a recent ECC from literature, we provide an end-to-end wiretap
coding scheme that is concrete, polynomial time efficient in
block length, semantically secure, and has both its probability of
error and semantic leakage exponentially diminishing with block
length. In fact, we prove that the semantic leakage in each of the
previous cases is exponentially decreasing with block length.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, Universal Hashing, UHF,
Semantic Security, Secrecy Capacity, Achievable rates, Fast
Fading channels, Leakage bounds, Full CSIT, Partial CSIT, No-
CSIT
I. INTRODUCTION
PHYSICAL layer security exploits the inherent random-ness in a communication environment to derive security;
this form of security makes no assumptions on the eavesdrop-
per’s capabilities. This is in direct contrast to computational
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based security which derives security based on the assumption
that the eavesdropper has bounded computational resources.
Computational based security has been the de facto security
for communication systems since its inception due especially
to its ease of implementation; however, the main assumption
of computational boundedness has been scrutinized in recent
years more than ever. One of the primary reasons for this
scrutiny is the potential advent of practical quantum computers
in the near future. On the other hand, physical layer security is
impervious to advances in computing, in particular quantum
computing, because it makes no underlying assumptions on
computational resources. Thus, regardless of the technology
the eavesdropper possesses, physical layer security maintains
its integrity. In this way, physical layer security is inherent
security.
Given this clear advantage of physical layer security, it is
still underutilized in modern communication systems. This
is primarily because most proposed schemes to implement
physical layer security are too impractical. The schemes are
most often only theorized to exist with a tangible construction
unknown, i.e., proofs are by existence and not by construction.
Moreover, even when a construction is given, it is rarely
efficient in block length.
Overcoming these hurdles has been one of the primary aims
of the physical layer community for quite some time. But there
is yet another reason physical layer security has not found
common use in new communication systems; this reason is
significantly more subtle. The measure of security provided
by most physical layer security schemes is insufficient to be
used in a practical setting.
There is no direct analog of this problem that arises from
computational based security because in that case the under-
lying assumption that certain decision problems are compu-
tationally hard is unproven anyway. Here, in physical layer
security where security is rigorously proven, the choice of
how security is measured needs to be consistent with reality
if the proof of security is to hold any merit.
If a physical layer scheme could be created that is tangible,
efficient, utilizes the most realistic measure of security, and
achieves an input/output rate near the theoretical maximum,
then physical layer security could potentially rival compu-
tational based security as the de facto security of modern
communication systems, or at the very least could be an indis-
pensable component. Motivated by this, herein we develop a
physical layer coding scheme that aims to satisfy all of these
properties and in some cases even does.
2A. Background - Security Metrics
Physical layer security is often modeled by a wiretap
channel which was introduced in the 1970’s by Wyner [1] and
later generalized by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2]. The metric used
to measure security in these works is now colloquially referred
to as the weak security metric. For years, this was the primary
metric used to measure security on wiretap channels, however,
it was asserted in the 1990’s in [3] that the weak metric
provided an inadequate measure of security to be deemed
practical. This led to the creation of the strong security metric,
the unnormalized version of the weak metric.
This metric sufficed for awhile, but in 2012, this metric
was again shown to be an inadequate measure of security
for realistic communication systems by Bellare, Tessaro, and
Vardy [4]. In addition to showing this, they created three new
security metrics provably stronger than the strong security
metric and proved them asymptotically equivalent. For the
purposes of this paper, due to their equivalence, we will
refer to all three of these metrics collectively as the semantic
security metric, the name given in [4]. This metric is now
held to be the gold standard of security metrics for the
wiretap channel. Moreover, it is argued that a stronger security
metric than the semantic security metric does not exist. For
these reasons, it is the only measure of security that should
be utilized in practice. Admittedly, proving results with this
metric tend to be more arduous, therefore many results in
literature still use the strong security metric and even the weak
security metric, but in this work we will exclusively use the
semantic metric to prove security.
B. Background - Fading Channels
In addition to focusing on physical layer security schemes
that are tangible, efficient, and utilize semantic security,
we will be primarily concerned with the most realistic of
wiretap channel models: the fading wiretap channel. Fading
wiretap channels are commonly used to model security of
wireless communications. It assumes the input signal is at-
tenuated/amplified then corrupted by some additive noise. The
amount of attenuation/amplification is called the channel state.
When the channel state changes frequently and independently,
we are in the so called fast fading regime. This is one of the
most practical fading wiretap channel models and is the main
focus of our applications.
Due to the nature of wireless systems, fading wiretap
channels sometimes assume that the current channel state
is fed back from the receiver to the transmitter (this is
abbreviated by CSIT - instantaneous channel state information
at the transmitter). However, since there are actually two point-
to-point channels within a wiretap channel, the transmitter
potentially receives both of these channel states, a channel
state corresponding to the intended receiver’s channel and a
channel state corresponding to the eavesdropper’s channel.
We denote the case when the transmitter knows neither of
these channel states by No-CSIT, although we do assume
the transmitter knows the statistics of the channel states as
random variables. We denote the case when the transmitter
knows the intended receiver’s current channel state but not
the eavesdropper’s current channel state (only the statistics) by
partial CSIT. Lastly, we denote the case when the transmitter
knows both current channel states by full CSIT.
The level of CSIT drastically changes which secure rates
are achievable. For this reason, we will treat No-CSIT, partial
CSIT, and full CSIT as separate wiretap channels entirely.
C. Related Work
In [4] and also in [5], a tangible (concrete) and efficient
wiretap coding scheme was given that could achieve positive
secrecy rates on discrete memoryless wiretap channels under
semantic security. In certain cases, this wiretap scheme could
also achieve the semantic secrecy capacity [6]. In [7], this
scheme was extended for use on the AWGN wiretap channel
and was shown to achieve the secrecy capacity, however, the
wiretap scheme therein was only able to achieve positive
secrecy rates under the strong security metric. In [8], however,
this wiretap scheme was shown to achieve the strong secrecy
capacity for both continuous and discrete wiretap channels.
Their proof is a direct bound on the strong leakage and
admits a nice characterization of the secure achievable rates.
In [9], a wiretap scheme was shown to achieve the semantic
secrecy capacity of AWGN wiretap channels, albeit in a
completely different manner than the previously mentioned
five papers. To date, there is currently no universal wiretap
scheme that achieves the semantic secrecy capacity for both
discrete memoryless and AWGN wiretap channels.
Physical layer security for fast fading wiretap channels
was arguably started with Liang, Poor, and Shamai in [10]
where they found the weak secrecy capacity of the fast fading
wiretap channel with the assumption of full CSIT. This was
later improved by Bloch and Laneman in [11] where they
determined the secrecy capacity of this channel under the
strong secrecy metric. In a different direction, Bloch and
Laneman [12] considered the case of fast fading wiretap
channels with partial CSIT; they gave a set of achievable
secrecy rates under the strong secrecy metric for this channel.
Their solution relies on an optimization problem that has no
closed form solution and thus it represents the best known
secrecy rate on the fast fading channel with partial CSIT.
In the case of fast fading channels with No-CSIT, it was
only recently shown in [13], [14], [15] that positive rates
are actually achievable and an upper bound for the secrecy
capacity is also derived. For a special class of fast fading
No-CSIT channels, [14] actually finds the secrecy capacity of
these channels under the weak secrecy constraint. In [16], a
positive semantically secure achievable rate is obtained for fast
fading channels with No-CSIT. To date, there are few results
involving semantic security on fast fading wiretap channels.
In particular, no one has constructed a wiretap scheme that
achieves the best possible semantically secure rates for each
case of CSIT. Moreover, hardly any wiretap schemes exist for
fast fading channels that are tangle/efficient and come close
to the best possible rates, even in the lesser weak and strong
cases.
3D. Summary of Results
The main purpose of this paper is to amplify results of
physical layer security into a more practical setting. We prove
all of our results using the semantic security metric, the
most demanding security metric in this field. Our wiretap
coding scheme developed is modular in the sense that it can
immediately be adapted to any existing channel to provide
semantic security; furthermore, it is shown to be concrete and
efficient1.
To prove our wiretap coding scheme is semantically secure,
we bound the semantic leakage asymptotically (Theorem 1).
We do this by upgrading the strong leakage bounds found in
[8]. In particular, we optimize over all message distributions.
As in [7], [8], our wiretap scheme is a modular scheme
consisting of a preprocessor based on UHFs. However, in
order to guarantee that our scheme is semantically secure, we
require the UHF to also have additional properties (we dub
UHFs with these additional properties as semantically secure
universal hash families - SS-UHFs). The additional properties
are non-restrictive in general and we provide a particular
implementation of an SS-UHF based on finite field arithmetic
that is concrete and quadratic time efficient. In effect, our SS-
UHF based preprocessor is a converter that takes in an off-
the-shelf ECC and converts it to a semantically secure wiretap
coding scheme (Theorem 2).
In Procedure 1 below, we outline the necessary steps for
using our wiretap scheme on an arbitrary wiretap channel.
Use of this procedure attains semantic security for any wiretap
channel contingent on certain conditions being satisfied which
are derived from the wiretap channel. We show that these
conditions are indeed satisfied for the DMC, AWGN, and fast
fading wiretap channels where we examine the fading channels
with various levels of instantaneous channel state information
at the transmitter. In other words, we demonstrate this proce-
dure, in effect, proving that our wiretap coding scheme can
achieve semantically secure rates on these channels.
The following are our specific contributions on each of the
aforementioned channels.
• DMC - In Theorem 3, we reestablish the result given
by Tal and Vardy’s upgrade [6] of Bellare, Tessaro, and
Vardy’s original result [4], [5]; that is, we show our wire-
tap coding scheme achieves the semantic secrecy capacity
of any symmetric, degraded, discrete memoryless wiretap
channel. However, we allow any ECC for the main point-
to-point channel in our construction. This is in contrast
to the previous results that impose certain restrictions on
the ECC in order to achieve secrecy capacity.
• AWGN - In Theorem 4, we reestablish [9] by constructing
a concrete, end-to-end efficient wiretap scheme and prove
that it can achieve the secrecy capacity on the AWGN
wiretap channel under semantic security. However, we
prefer our wiretap scheme in the fact that it is modular:
the same preprocessor used here can be used on any
channel without modification.
1As will be made clear in Section III, we only prove the preprocessor is
concrete and efficient; however, if the error correcting code is also such, then
so is the entire wiretap coding scheme.
• No-CSIT - In Theorem 5, we prove that our wiretap
scheme achieves the semantic secrecy capacity here for
the case when the eavesdropper’s channel is stochastically
degraded (cf. [14]) with respect to the main channel. Fur-
thermore, in other cases, we provide a set of semantically
secure achievable rates.
• Partial CSIT - In Theorem 6, we prove that our wiretap
scheme achieves the best known achievable secrecy rates
to date (cf. [17]) with semantic security.
• Full CSIT - In Theorem 7, we prove that our scheme can
actually achieve the strong secrecy capacity in this setting
with semantic security thereby proving that semantic se-
crecy capacity is equivalent to the strong secrecy capacity
and hence also the weak secrecy capacity.
All of the achievable semantically secure rates on these
channels can be attained concretely and efficiently (Proposi-
tion 1 and Proposition 2) - since our preprocessor is already
such, one only needs to concentrate on finding an error
correcting code that is concrete and efficient. Once this is done,
the entire wiretap coding scheme is concrete and efficient! In
other words, we have converted the problem of finding good
wiretap coding schemes into a problem of finding good error
correcting coding schemes where good here means concrete
and efficient.
To recap, we give in this paper a procedure for attaining
semantically secure rates in a concrete and efficient way
for arbitrary wiretap channels. We apply this procedure in
particular to the five aforementioned channels. Therefore, if
the reader desires to attain semantically secure rates on one of
these channels, all that remains is to find an error correcting
code. As a special case, we have pointed the reader to an
ideal error correcting code for the AWGN wiretap channel,
thereby completing the procedure in this case in full. If the
reader wants to attain semantic security on a wiretap channel
not listed above, then the reader must apply Procedure 1 in its
entirety. Specifically, the reader must check that the hypothesis
of Theorem 2 is satisfied for that channel.
E. Outline
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces notation and gives the preliminary mathe-
matical background necessary to proceed through the rest of
the paper. Section III presents our modular wiretap coding
scheme and gives a concrete and efficient implementation of
the preprocessor based on finite field arithmetic. Section IV
analyzes both the security and achievable rates of our proposed
wiretap scheme and gives a procedure for how to utilize our
main results on an arbitrary (discrete or continuous) wiretap
channel. In Section V, we apply this procedure to the DMC
and AWGN wiretap channels as a first application and show
how our wiretap scheme replicates the best results from
literature. Section VI considers fast fading wiretap channels
with various levels of CSIT (No-CSIT, partial CSIT, and full
CSIT) and gives semantically secure achievable rates for each
of these. Moreover, we show how our wiretap scheme in these
cases exceeds the best results from literature.
In an attempt to give a more polished presentation, we have
assigned nearly all of the proofs to the appendices.
4II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation and Conventions
We shall write an to denote an n-dimensional vector where
ai denotes the i-th component, i.e., a
n = (a1, . . . , an). We
use the usual notation ‖an‖ to denote the Euclidean norm. We
shall denote the indicator (or characteristic) function by 1A(x)
or 1 (x ∈ A) and will take all logarithms in this paper to be
base 2 unless we write ln, for which we mean the logarithm of
base e. We will write N, R and C to denote the set of natural,
real, and complex numbers respectively. With a slight abuse of
notation, we will write R+ to denote the set of non-negative
reals. We will write |A| to denote the cardinality of set A.
We will denote random variables by capital letters and will
denote the spaces for which a random variable is defined by
a respective scripted letter, e.g., A is a random variable with
values in A. As usual we write X ∈ unif(X ) to denote that
X is a uniform random variable over some discrete set X ;
we write Y ∈ N (a, b) to denote that Y is a real Gaussian
random variable with mean a and standard deviation b; we
write Z ∈ CN (a, b) to denote that Z is a circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian random variable with mean a and standard
deviation b.
We shall use the notation of [2], [8] and let I(A∧B) denote
the usual mutual information between random variables A and
B. We write A⊥B when random variable A is independent
of B. We write P [A] to denote the probability of event A
and E [A] to denote the expected value of random variable A.
When we want to be explicit about which random variable we
are taking the probability (resp. expected value) with respect
to, we shall denote the random variable by a subscript.
We denote all probability densities2 by ω( · ) defined by
the Radon-Nykodym derivative with respect to some implicit
reference measure; we will almost always denote this reference
measure by µ. We denote the conditional probability density in
an analogous way as ω( · | · ). As an example of our notation,
if A and B are random variables on A and B respectively, then
ω(a) denotes the probability density of A and ω(b|a) denotes
the conditional probability density of B given A = a.
When algorithms are completed in polynomial time (in the
worst case) then we take up the standard convention and call
such algorithms efficient.
B. Channels
Let X and Y be sets. We shall denote a stochastic map
by T : X  Y . Given x ∈ X , a stochastic map assigns
a likelihood that x will map to a certain y ∈ Y . For each
x ∈ X , this induces the random variable T (x). The support
of this random variable, supp(T (x)) ⊂ Y , is the elements in
Y that T can map x to with non-zero likelihood.
Let T : X  Y be some stochastic map, X a random
variable on X , µ some reference measure on Y , and Y =
T ◦X = T (X). We will call the conditional density ω(y|x)
the transition density of the stochastic map T and we will
call the tuple (X , ω(y|x),Y) a channel. We will often abuse
2Sometimes when we have a probability mass function, instead we will use
the notation P (·) with appropriate subscripts as necessary.
language/notation and call T itself a channel. The transition
density probabilistically tells us how the channel is mapping
X to Y . Given that some symbol x ∈ X was sent across the
channel, the probability that Y is in some subset U ⊂ Y is
given by
∫
U
ω(y|x)µ(dy).
For the rest of this paper, we will be considering sub-
normalized channels: channels with transition densities such
that
∫
Y ω(y|x)µ(dy) ≤ 1. This is a technical condition that
allows us to define the following. Given a channel T =
(X , ω(y|x),Y) and subset T ⊂ X × Y denote ωT (y|x) =
ω(y|x)1 ((x, y) ∈ T ). This induces a restricted channel as
follows. Given that x ∈ X was sent across the restricted
channel, the probability that Y is in some subset U ⊂ Y is
given by
∫
U
ωT (y|x)µ(dy) =
∫
U
ω(y|x)1 ((x, y) ∈ T )µ(dy).
C. Error Correcting Codes
We will always refer to the number of channel uses3 as the
block length (of the code) and denote it by n. As usual, we
will mainly be considering the n-letter extension of channel
T notated by T n = (Xn, ω(yn|xn),Yn).
Let M′ be some finite message set. An n-length encoder
for T n is an injective function en : M′ → Xn. The image
en(M′) ⊂ Xn is called the codebook and is denoted Cn.
Elements of the codebook are referred to as codewords. An
n-length decoder for T n is a function dn : Yn → M′ and
an n-length code is a tuple Cn = (en, dn). The rate of the
code is given by RCn =
1
n log |M′|. Lastly, a family of codes{Cn}n∈N is called a coding scheme C with rate given by RC =
limn→∞RCn , where we assume this limit exists.
The maximum probability of error for code Cn is given by
Pe(Cn) = maxM ′∈M′ P[(dn ◦T n ◦en)(M ′) 6= M ′]. If Pe(Cn)
is sufficiently small then Cn is called an error correcting code
(ECC). If every code in scheme C is an ECC, we call C an
ECC scheme. If Pe(Cn) → 0 as n → ∞ then we say the
scheme C is reliable. In particular, if log(Pe(Cn)) ≤ −anb for
some constants a, b > 0 and for every n, then we call the ECC
scheme C exceptionally reliable.
Remark. It was noted in [4] that “good” error correcting cod-
ing schemes in practice should satisfy the reliability condition
exponentially fast; they called such ECC schemes “strongly
reliable.” Due to the plethora of definitions containing the
wording “strong” in the literature, we have instead called
such ECC schemes here “exceptionally reliable.”
For continuous channels (i.e. X = Y = R) we shall always
impose the average power constraint as usual. In more detail,
for some fixed constant P , we shall require the code to satisfy
1
n ||xn||2 ≤ P for every xn ∈ Cn.
The supremum of reliable achievable rates over all ECC
schemes is known as the (point-to-point) channel capacity. We
shall denote the channel capacity of a channel T by CT .
D. Wiretap Codes
Let T = (X , ω(y|x),Y) be a channel that models the
communication between a transmitter Alice and intended
3Note that we are only considering discrete-time channels in this work.
5receiver Bob. Let E = (X , ω(z|x),Z) be a channel modeling
the unintended communication between Alice and a passive
eavesdropper Eve. We call the pair of channels W = (T,E)
the wiretap channel.
Note that we have chosen the letters T , E, and W so as
to denote the Transmission channel, Eavesdropper’s channel,
and Wiretap channel. We also note that the n-letter wiretap
channel is given by Wn = (T n, En).
The goal of physical layer security as modeled by a wiretap
channel is for Alice to communicate information reliably to
Bob while keeping that same information hidden from Eve.
Let M ∈ M be the random variable representing the message
Alice wants to impart to Bob yet keep secret from Eve.
Let Zn ∈ Zn be the n-letter random variable representing
Eve’s output. To measure security, we recall the most common
security metrics.
• [1] Weak:
1
n
I(M ∧ Zn), M ∼ unif(M).
• [18] Strong4:
I(M ∧ Zn), M ∼ unif(M).
• [4] Semantic:
max
PM
I(M ∧ Zn).
We refer to each of these quantities as leakage and we say
that a coding scheme is secure under a given metric if its
respective leakage goes to 0 as n → ∞. In a similar fashion
to exceptional reliability, we say that a coding scheme is
exceptionally secure if the leakage is vanishing exponentially
fast with n.
Remark. The expression for semantic security above is tech-
nically called mutual information security (MIS) as originally
defined in [4]. Semantic security (in the wiretap context)
is actually defined using guessing probabilities. However,
therein it was shown for discrete channels (and in [19] for
continuous channels) that MIS was equivalent to semantic
security asymptotically. Thus, in the asymptotic regime there is
no need to differentiate between the two metrics because each
implies the other. Hence, our choice of name is technically
justified.
However, one may still ask why we call the definition above
“semantic security” when it is actually the definition of MIS;
the reasoning is as follows. The definition of semantic security
in [4] is named such to allude to the gold standard definition
from computational based security [20]. However, the defini-
tion of semantic security is considerably less tractable than
the definition of MIS. In order to get the best of both worlds,
we have chosen our naming convention. We note that it is a
convention already followed by other works.
LetW = {Wn}n∈N be a coding scheme for channel T (and
inherently channelE) using message setM. We sayW is a X-
wiretap coding scheme, where X ∈ {weak, strong, semantic},
if it satisfies each of the following.
4Strong security is sometimes referred to as MIS-R, cf. [4].
• Reliability: W is a reliable ECC scheme for T .
• Security: W is secure (relative to E) using the X-metric.
If these two conditions are satisfied exceptionally, then we
say that W is an outstanding X-wiretap coding scheme.
If Rs = limn→∞
1
n log |M| is the rate of an X wiretap
coding scheme, then we say Rs is an X achievable secrecy
rate. We call the supremum of all X achievable secrecy rates
the X secrecy capacity denoted by Cs
∣∣
X
or simply Cs when
the metric is clear from context.
Fact 1. If all secure rates Rs achievable under the weak
secrecy metric are also achievable under the semantic secrecy
metric, then:
Cs
∣∣
weak
= Cs
∣∣
semantic
.
E. Universal Hashing
Let M = {0, 1}k be the set of binary strings of length k,
M′ and S be finite sets, and S a uniform random variable
on S. Consider now a family of a finite number of functions
indexed by S:
F = {fs :M′ →M| s ∈ S}.
(i) F is called a universal hash family (UHF) if for every
m′1 6= m′2 ∈ M′,
|{s ∈ S | fs(m′1) = fs(m′2)}| ≤
|S|
2k
.
(ii) F is called uniform if for every m′ ∈ M′ and for every
m ∈ M,
|{s ∈ S | fs(m′) = m}| = |S|
2k
.
(iii) F is called b-regular if for every s ∈ S and for every
m ∈ M,
|{m′ ∈ M′ | fs(m′) = m}| = 2b.
(iv) F is called invertible if for each s ∈ S there exists some
stochastic mapping φs : M  M′ such that for all
m ∈ M and y ∈ supp(φs(m)), fs(y) = m. If φs(m) is
a uniform random variable for every s ∈ S and m ∈M
then we call F evenly invertible.
(v) Lastly, we call F a semantically secure universal hash
family (SS-UHF) if it is: (i) universal, (ii) uniform, (iii)
b-regular, and (iv) evenly invertible.
Many of the definitions here coincide with those found
in computer science literature. The conditions of being a
universal hash family (as introduced in [21]) and uniform
are found in most textbooks on hash families. The condition
of being b-regular and invertible can be found in [5] and
[8]. That being said, we have invented some terminology.
We have dubbed hash families that are universal, uniform, b-
regular, and evenly invertible as semantically secure universal
hash families to emphasize that hash families with these four
properties are the proper ones for inducing semantic security
(see Section IV).
6F. ǫ-smooth α-Mutual Information
In order to measure the amount of information leaked to
the eavesdropper using our wiretap scheme, we will need to
employ the use of a different measure of information, known
as α-mutual information. α-mutual information is defined
using Re´nyi entropy and is actually a generalization of the
usual mutual information defined by Shannon.
For a discrete random variable M ′ over M′, the following
generalizes Shannon’s entropy and is called Re´nyi entropy of
order α ∈ (1,∞) [22]: Hα(M ′) = 11−α log (
∑
m′ ω(m
′)α).
This can be extended by continuity to the cases of α = 1
and α =∞ where H1(M ′) is the usual Shannon entropy and
H∞(M
′) is the usual min-entropy. In particular, when M ′ is
uniform, for any α ∈ [1,∞] we have Hα(M ′) = log(|M′|),
a fact we will use frequently.
In a similar way, one can define conditional Re´nyi entropy,
however, there is no universal notion of such a definition in
literature as different definitions can be employed based on
the specific properties one desires (cf. [23], [24]). We will be
using Arimoto’s definition [25], [26] given as follows.
Let Z∗ be an arbitrary random variable over Z∗ (with
measure µ on Z∗) and M ′ a discrete random variable over
M′. Then conditional Re´nyi entropy of order α ∈ (1,∞) is
given by:
Hα(M
′|Z∗)
=
α
1− α log
∫
Z∗
ω(z∗)
(∑
m′
ω(m′|z∗)α
) 1
α
µ(dz∗).
Just as in the case of (unconditioned) Re´nyi entropy, this
definition can be extended to the cases of α = 1 and α =∞
by continuity. For α→ 1, one easily checks using L’Hospitals
rule that Hα(M
′|Z∗) becomes H(M ′|Z∗), the conditional
Shannon entropy. For α→∞, the definition becomes
H∞(M
′|Z∗) = − log
∫
Z∗
ω(z∗)max
m′
ω(m′|z∗)µ(dz∗),
and is often referred to as conditional min-entropy. Another
important case for which we would like to emphasize is when
α = 2:
H2(M
′|Z∗) = −2 log
∫
Z∗
ω(z∗)
(∑
m′
ω(m′|zn)2
) 1
2
µ(dz∗),
which is often referred to as conditional collision entropy.
Now let us finally define α-mutual information: the Re´nyi
extension to Shannon’s mutual information. Again, there is
no universal definition in literature but we will be using the
definition put forth in [26] for the special case when M ′ is a
uniform random variable.
Let M ′ and Z∗ be random variables as before except now
we require M ′ to be uniform over M′. For α ∈ [1,∞] we
define the α-mutual information between M ′ and Z∗ by
Iα(M
′ ∧ Z∗) = log |M′| −Hα(M ′|Z∗).
Notice that I1(M
′ ∧ Z∗) is exactly Shannon’s mutual in-
formation I(M ′ ∧ Z∗) so in this case we will drop the
subscript. Moreover, for the case of α = 2, we will often
call I2(M
′ ∧ Z∗) collision-information and for the case of
α =∞, we will often call I∞(M ′ ∧ Z∗) max-information.
Fact 2. [26], [27] For any α ∈ [1,∞], Iα(M ′ ∧ Z∗) is
monotonically increasing in α.
Note that this fact justifies the name of I∞(M
′ ∧ Z∗)
as max-information because it measure the most amount of
information of all of the α-mutual informations.
The α-mutual information also admits several other desir-
able properties of an “information measure” which can be
found in [27]. Note however that this definition of α-mutual
information is not symmetric in its arguments and does not
satisfy the chain rule in general. This of course is in contrast
to Shannon’s mutual information.
To facilitate our proofs later on we will also need a concept
called ǫ-smooth α-mutual information. Basically, we will
define α-mutual information on a portion of the entire space
that probabilistically contains enough content up to some ǫ. To
make this rigorous we first introduce the concept of a typical
set.
For ǫ ≥ 0, we call a subset T ⊂M′×Z∗ a (1− ǫ)-typical
set if
P [(M ′, Z∗) ∈ T |M ′ = m′] ≥ 1− ǫ, ∀m′ ∈M′.
Furthermore, we will denote the set of all (1− ǫ)-typical sets
by Tǫ. Typical sets intuitively contain almost all that there is
to know about our space up to some ǫ, hence the name typical.
For some typical set T , we first define the conditional Re´nyi
entropy of order α restricted to T . This is simply given by
HTα (M
′|Z∗)
=
α
1− α log
∫
Z∗
ω(z∗)
(∑
m′
ωT (m
′|z∗)α
) 1
α
µ(dz∗).
Given ǫ ≥ 0 define ǫ-smooth α-mutual information forM ′
uniform over M′ by
Iǫα(M
′ ∧ Z∗) = inf
T ∈Tǫ
ITα (M
′ ∧ Z∗),
where α-mutual information evaluated on T is given by
ITα (M
′ ∧ Z∗) = log |M′| −HTα (M ′|Z∗).
Given some threshold ǫ, we find the smallest value that
α-mutual information could possibly be when defined on
the subnormalized channels corresponding to those sets that
contain enough probability with respect to our threshold.
Later, we will bound the leakage between the transmitter and
eavesdropper as an increasing function of this metric; thus,
defining ǫ-smooth α-mutual information using the infimum
provides the tightest bound we should expect when ǫ is our
threshold.
Note that when ǫ = 0, Tǫ contains only sets equal to the
entire space less a set of measure zero and hence I0α(M
′ ∧
Z∗) = Iα(M
′ ∧ Z∗).
Analogous to Fact 2 we have the following ordering for ǫ-
smooth α-mutual information, a result we will use in proving
our wiretap scheme is secure.
7Lemma 1. For any T ⊂ M′×Z∗ and α ∈ [1,∞], ITα (M ′ ∧
Z∗) is monotonically increasing in α.
Proof. This follows easily from the proof given for [26,
Proposition 1] replacing the densities ω(m′|z∗) by ωT (m′|z∗)
and noting that all inequalities still hold. 
III. A WIRETAP CODING SCHEME
In this section we will furnish a wiretap coding scheme W
for an arbitrary5 wiretap channel which is based on a wiretap
scheme put forth in [5], [7], and [8]. We will first define each
step of this scheme and show that it is reliable (we will show
security in the next section). Then we will give a particular
implementation and show that this implementation is efficient
with respect to the block length n.
Over an arbitrary wiretap channel W = (T,E) our wiretap
coding scheme W involves combining an SS-UHF with a
reliable ECC already in use over the main point-to-point
channel. This modular wiretap scheme is precisely the scheme
put forth in [5], [7], [8] except there the UHF was only
required to be b-regular and evenly invertible. Here, we are
also demanding that our UHF be uniform. The necessity of
this extra property will be elucidated in the next section when
we prove that our scheme is semantically secure.
Consider Figure 1; this describes our wiretap scheme over-
all. We will now describe in detail each layer.
M M
′ Xn Y n M̂ ′ Mˆ
Z
n
φs en T n dn fs
En
Fig. 1. Wiretap coding scheme.
A. Preprocessing Layer
Consider the finite sets M = {0, 1}k and M′ = {0, 1}l
with l > k. We shall refer to M ∈ M as the actual message
and M ′ ∈ M′ as the pseudo-message because M represents
the information the transmitter actually wishes to impart to
the intended receiver securely, whereas M ′ is some random
variation of the actual message necessary for security. We will
not assume which distribution the message M takes.
Over a fixed arbitrary finite set S, the transmitter will first
draw a seed S ∼ unif(S) to be used for the remainder
of transmission. We assume the seed is independent of the
message M and that the realized seed is publicly available
to all parties. All communication must take place over the
wiretap channel; however, we show in Appendix C that the
transmitter can send the seed before the transmission of an
actual message with no asymptotic loss in rate or security.
The transmitter now chooses an SS-UHF F = {fs :
M′ →M| s ∈ S}. Suppose each function fs in the SS-UHF
5Here arbitrary indeed means any discrete-time wiretap channel; however,
a positive secrecy rate may not be attainable on some wiretap channels.
has its invertible stochastic mapping given by φs. Choosing
our message as M = m and seed as S = s, we will
choose our pseudo-message to be M ′ = φs(m). Since F
is evenly invertible and b-regular, M ′ is a uniform random
variable on 2b elements of M′. In particular, ω(m′|m, s) =
2−b1 (m′ ∈ supp(φs(m))) = 2−b1 (fs(m′) = m).
B. Coding Layer
The transmitter chooses some reliable ECC scheme6 C =
{Cn}n∈N. We will assume (as per standard) that each party
has full knowledge of C. Thus, for a given blocklength n,
each party knows Cn is the codebook and we have inherently
induced new channels: T n : Cn → Yn and En : Cn → Zn.
We will henceforth be considering these as the main transmis-
sion channel and eavesdropper’s channel respectively for the
remainder of this work. At this point the transmitter encodes
the pseudo-message M ′ using en, this will be a random
variable Xn = en(M
′) over Cn. Now the transmitter sends
Xn over the wiretap channelW = (T,E); that is, the channel
input Xn is sent across T n but also across En inherently.
C. Intended Receiver’s Decoding Layer
The intended receiver will receive a noisy version of the
channel input Y n = T n(en(M
′)). The goal of the intended
receiver is to correctly guess which realization of the random
variable M ′ was sent given the realization of the random
variable Y n. This is accomplished using the estimate M̂ ′ =
dn(Y
n). Since we have assumed C to be reliable, each Cn is an
ECC and thus the probability of error Pe(Cn) is considerably
low. In particular, for some finite n this means there is a
high probability that M̂ ′ will equal M ′; this equality happens
almost surely asymptotically with n. In short, the intended
receiver will be able to undo the coding layer entirely.
Next, the intended receiver shall post-process M̂ ′ to an
estimate of the actual message M̂ using the hash function
corresponding to the public seed S. That is, given that S = s
the intended receiver’s estimate is given as M̂ = fs(M̂
′).
Since we assumed our SS-UHF to be invertible, if M̂ ′ is
equal to M ′ then the UHF is guaranteed to map M̂ ′ to
M (the original message); however, we showed that this
happens almost surely asymptotically with n. In this sense,
the pre/post processing layers do not subtract anything from
our reliability. In more detail, if C is reliable to begin with
then our entire wiretap scheme will also satisfy reliability.
Furthermore, if C is exceptionally reliable, then our wiretap
scheme is exceptionally reliable as well.
D. Eavesdropper’s Decoding Layer
Once the eavesdropper receives her channel output Zn =
En(en(M
′)) she will attempt to decode it in a similar fashion
to that of the intended receiver; however, we will not assume
how she decodes her output since that could affect our measure
of security. As a side note, in contrast to computational based
security methods, we also do not assume the boundedness of
resources at the eavesdropper.
6We always assume that the scheme satisfies the power constraint for the
channel if there is one.
8E. Discussion
As in [8], we call the preceding scheme modular since the
pre/post processing layers are not intrusive to the main channel
in any way in terms of either reliability or constructibility.
That is, our preprocessing layer could be added to any already
existing communication system without changing any core
components of the original system.
F. Explicit Construction
Does such a wiretap scheme exist? By extensions of Shan-
non’s channel coding theorem we know that if RC < CT then
a reliable ECC scheme C exists. Since our wiretap scheme is
a concatenation of a pre/post processing layer with a reliable
ECC, we now only need to be concerned if such a pre/post
processing scheme exists; in particular, if an SS-UHF exists.
In this subsection we give an explicit construction of an
SS-UHF. Our construction is inspired by those given in [5],
[7], [8]; however, there, the UHF’s can be shown to not satisfy
uniformity which is essential to our proof showing our wiretap
scheme is semantically secure in the next section.
Consider the following family of functions
F∗ = {fs,t :M′ →M | s ∈ {0, 1}l \ 0l, t ∈ {0, 1}l}
where fs,t(m
′) = [(s⊙m′)⊕ t]k and M = {0, 1}k and
M′ = {0, 1}l as before. Here, all l-length bit strings
correspond to their respective elements in the finite field
GF (2l,⊕,⊙) (where ⊕ and ⊙ denote addition and multiplica-
tion in the field respectively), [·]k selects the k most significant
bits, and 0l denotes the all-0 bit string of length l (which is
correspondent to the additive identity in GF (2l)). As a remark,
we note that ⊕ here is equivalent to modulo-2/bitwise/XOR
addition and S = {0, 1}l \0l×{0, 1}l where |S| = (2l−1)2l.
For some random variable R ∼ unif({0, 1}l−k) and (s, t) ∈
S consider the inverses of fs,t given by
φs,t,R(m) = s
−1 ⊙ ((m||R)⊕ t) .
Here s−1 is the inverse element of s in GF (2l) (which always
exists because s is non-zero) and (·||·) represents usual bit-
string concatenation.
Proposition 1. The family of functions F∗ is an SS-UHF.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
With this we have constructed a concrete (algorithmic)
implementation of an SS-UHF: this means that our wiretap
coding scheme W of the previous subsection always exists.
Specifically, our pre/post processing layers are given con-
cretely so that if the reliable ECC C is also given concretely,
then so is the entire wiretap scheme. Let us emphasize again
that this is in contrast to much of the literature wherein wiretap
schemes are implicitly defined through proofs by existence.
The fact that our wiretap scheme is explicitly given is
necessary for realistic wiretap schemes but not quite enough
in terms of practicality. We would also like our scheme to be
efficient with block length n. Fortunately, our pre/post pro-
cessing scheme is efficient as proven in the next proposition.
In other words, when the reliable ECC scheme C is efficient,
so is the entire wiretap scheme.
Proposition 2.
1) Given m ∈M, (s, t) ∈ S, and r ∈ {0, 1}l−k, the inverse
φs,t,r(m) can be computed in quadratic-time with respect
to n.
2) Given (s, t) ∈ S and m′ ∈ M′, the function fs,t(m′)
can be computed in quadratic time with respect to n.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
In conclusion of this section, we have constructed a concrete
and efficient wiretap scheme that is polynomially time com-
putable with block length n. We note that the construction
given here is by no means unique and one could use any
concrete and efficient SS-UHF as the pre/post processing
layers of our wiretap scheme W .
IV. ACHIEVABLE SEMANTICALLY SECURE RATES
We have already seen that the wiretap scheme we con-
structed in Section III satisfies the reliability property of
a wiretap scheme as long as the ECC C is reliable (and
does so exceptionally when C is chosen to be exceptionally
reliable). Now we need to show that the scheme satisfies the
security property of a wiretap scheme as well. In this section
we will do just that by constructing leakage bounds for the
semantic metric. It will turn out that under certain conditions
our leakage bounds asymptotically go to 0 implying that our
scheme is a semantically secure wiretap scheme. In particular,
under further restrictions, our wiretap scheme is shown to be
outstanding.
It is noted that leakage bounds for arbitrary wiretap channels
using evenly invertible, b-regular UHFs are already given in
[8]; however, the leakage there assumes the secret message
M follows a uniform distribution and hence will only lead
to strong security at best. As a reminder, strong security is
not a sufficient measure of security in real world applications
because often times messages are not uniformly distributed.
We therefore need to generalize the leftover hash lemma
(channel version) in [8] to overcome this obstacle. What
becomes obvious upon proof is that considering UHF’s that
are only evenly invertible and b-regular is not quite restrictive
enough to lead to semantic security; this explains why in our
wiretap coding scheme of Section III we chose our UHF to
also be uniform.
For the remainder of this section, we will writeW = {Wn}
to be the modular wiretap coding scheme described in Sec-
tion III.
A. Semantic Leakage Bounds
Theorem 1. Using W on any wiretap channel W = (T,E),
for ǫ ≥ 0 we have
max
PM
I(M ∧ Zn) ≤ 1
ln 2
2
1
2 (−b+I
ǫ
2(M
′∧Zn)) + ǫk
≤ 1
ln 2
2
1
2 (−b+I
ǫ
∞(M
′∧Zn)) + ǫk.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Note the striking resemblance of our first inequality to [28,
Theorem 3] for secret key agreements. There, they also used
9universal hashing to amplify privacy. Also note that our bounds
generalize those provided in [8]. Therein, the message was
assumed to be uniform, whereas here we make no a priori
assumptions on PM . Admittedly, we require an SS-UHF for
the pre/post processors whereas they require an SS-UHF less
the uniform requirement for the pre/post processors. However,
we have provided in Section III-F an efficient and concrete
construction, thereby alleviating any doubts that such a hash
family exists. Lastly, we note that an attempt to generalize the
bounds of [8] to the ones given here has already been given
in literature but was redacted due to an error. Our approach is
noticeably different allowing our proof to overcome said error.
We will only be concerned with the second inequality of
Theorem 1 for the remainder of this paper. It is considerably
more tractable computationally and has already been studied
in [8].
Recall the wiretap scheme W consists of a pre/post pro-
cessor and an ECC scheme C. Theorem 1 makes no a priori
assumptions on what that ECC scheme is. Once we actually
pick the ECC, however, we can characterize Theorem 1 more
appropriately. In particular, suppose we choose a reliable ECC
C = {Cn} with each Cn having rate RCn = ln and with
the overall rate of each Wn given by Rn = kn . Now since
the ECC has been chosen, there is a deterministic bijective
mapping between M′ and Cn = en(M′). Thus if M ′ is a
random variable on M′ then en(M ′) is a random variable on
Cn with the same distribution as M
′. For convenience, define
the random variable Xn = en(M
′) and note that it is defined
only over Cn not Xn. With these observations in mind, we
can reformulate Theorem 1 as follows.
Corollary 1. Using W with reliable deterministic ECC C on
any wiretap channel W = (T,E), for ǫ ≥ 0 we have
max
PM
I(M ∧Zn) ≤ 1
ln 2
2−
n
2 (RCn−Rn−
1
n I
ǫ
∞
(Xn∧Zn)) + ǫnRn.
B. Semantically Secure Rates
With the previous two bounds on the semantic leakage in
mind, we would like to know under what conditions they
asymptotically (with respect to n) approach 0. In this way,
those conditions will tell us precisely when our wiretap coding
scheme W is semantically secure. It is fortunate that these
conditions can be described in terms of Rs (the asymptotic
achievable secrecy rate), RC (the rate of the ECC scheme),
and 1nI
ǫ
∞(X
n ∧ Zn) (ǫ-smooth max-information per channel
symbol).
Let (·)+ = max( · , 0). The following theorem characterizes
which secure rates are achievable under semantic security and
we will be using its conclusions frequently throughout the rest
of this paper.
Theorem 2. Using W with a reliable deterministic ECC C
on any wiretap channel W = (T,E), if ǫ is chosen such that
ǫn→ 0 as n→∞ then we have the following.
(1)
Rs <
(
RC − lim
n→∞
1
n
Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn)
)+
using semantic security.
(2) If limn→∞
1
nI
ǫ
∞(X
n ∧ Zn) ≤ ξ then
Rs <
(
RC − ξ
)+
using semantic security.
(3) If ǫ is exponentially diminishing to 0 with n, then for any
secure rates as in (1) and (2),W is exceptionally semanti-
cally secure. Moreover, if C is exceptionally reliable, then
W is an outstanding semantically secure wiretap scheme.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Remark. In Section VI, we will apply this theorem to channels
with side information (extra information available to Alice that
may help her deduce better security or reliability, of which
fading channels are a special case). In that case, we will
restate this theorem in a more suitable form (see Corollary 3).
Given any wiretap channel, Theorem 2.1 says all one needs
to do is calculate limn→∞
1
nI
ǫ
∞(X
n ∧ Zn), then use of the
wiretap schemeW will guarantee that rates Rs are achievable
with semantic security. However, finding this limit is probably
not feasible. For fixed n, the ǫ-smooth max-information is
basically an n-dimensional integral where each point of the
integral is a maximization over a set with roughly 2n elements.
This problem is exponentially hard unless one can exactly
characterize the “regions” of the integrand that have the same
maximum. Characterization of these regions is an interesting
line of future work but we do not explore that any further here.
Luckily, we do not need to calculate limn→∞
1
nI
ǫ
∞(X
n ∧
Zn) exactly. Theorem 2.2 says an upper bound to this limit
suffices. We will primarily be using this result for the remain-
der of this paper due to its tractability. In forthcoming sections
we will see that this still yields surprisingly favorable results.
The leakage bound, ξ, in Theorem 2.2 can be thought of as
a parameter of the eavesdropper’s channel. Moreover, it can be
thought of as the loss we incur when converting an ECC into
a semantically secure wiretap code by our procedure. That is,
given an ECC of rate RC , our procedure converts that ECC
into a semantically secure wiretap code of rate RC − ξ.
Theorem 2.3 says that in order to control the speed by
which the semantic leakage diminishes with n, we only need
to control the speed by which ǫ diminishes with n where we
recall that ǫ is a parameter that controls how much of the total
space (with respect to probability) we are considering. We note
that when ǫ = 0 we are always considering the entire space
for every n so that the condition of Theorem 2.3 is trivially
satisfied and we have exceptional semantic security. We will
not pursue such an approach in this paper as the ǫ > 0 case is
much more manageable. However, in all of our applications,
ǫ will be exponentially diminishing with n so that we will get
exceptional semantic security.
Recall that CT is the point-to-point channel capacity of
Alice and Bob’s channel and CE is the point-to-point channel
capacity of Alice and Eve’s channel. The following is a
special case of Theorem 2.2.
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Corollary 2. If ξ = CE , ǫn → 0 as n → ∞, and we pick a
reliable deterministic ECC C with rate arbitrarily close to CT
then
Rs < (CT − CE)+
with semantic security.
This corollary is particularly satisfying considering that
many channels have their weak secrecy capacity given by
CT −CE . Thus in those cases, if we can satisfy the conditions
of Corollary 2, we can achieve the secrecy capacity using our
wiretap schemeW and moreover, we immediately have proven
that the semantic secrecy capacity is equivalent to the weak
secrecy capacity by using Fact 1, a result not known in general.
C. Summary of Wiretap Coding Scheme
Let us end this section by summarizing what we have shown
for our wiretap scheme so far and explain how this can be
applied in practice and in theory.
Our wiretap scheme outlined precisely in Section III is a
combination of a pre/post processor based on an SS-UHF to-
gether with a reliable ECC scheme. We constructed a concrete
and efficient SS-UHF in Section III and showed that it did
not affect the reliability of the ECC scheme. Hence, since
we always assume the ECC scheme is chosen to be reliable,
our entire wiretap scheme is always reliable. Moreover, when
the ECC is exceptionally reliable the entire scheme is also
exceptionally reliable.
In this section, we showed that over a truly arbitrary
wiretap channel, our wiretap scheme’s semantic leakage can
be bounded using Theorem 1 or Corollary 1. Moreover, if
the threshold probability ǫ of our space (a parameter solely
designed to aide in the proof) is chosen so that ǫn → 0 as
n→∞ then Theorem 2 gives us a precise characterization of
when our wiretap coding scheme is semantically secure over
any wiretap channel.
To this end, we find it beneficial to outline the steps one
shall take in applying our wiretap scheme to a wiretap channel
of their choice.
Procedure 1. The following is the general procedure one
should take when using our wiretap scheme over an arbitrary
wiretap channel W = (T,E).
1. Find which achievable rates Rs are supported on W .
• For each n, construct a (1 − ǫ)-typical set T where
ǫn→ 0 as n→∞.
– Preferably construct T so that ǫ is exponentially
diminishing to 0 so that we induce exceptional
semantic security.
• Find an upper bound ξ such that
lim
n→∞
1
n
Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn) ≤ ξ.
– Ideally, one should find the smallest possible ξ as
to guarantee higher achievable rates.
– One could also compute limn→∞
1
nI
ǫ
∞(X
n ∧ Zn)
directly as mentioned previously, but currently this
is seemingly intractable.
2. Choose operating point Rs .
• We can achieve all rates Rs <
(
RC − ξ
)+
with
semantic security (Theorem 2.2).
– We must choose RC > ξ in order to have positive
secrecy rates using our wiretap scheme over W .
However, if this is not possible then either ξ was
chosen poorly or the channel does not allow a
positive semantic secrecy rate with our wiretap
scheme.
3. Build the wiretap coding scheme W .
• Find a reliable ECC scheme C of rate RC for use over
the main point-to-point channel.
– Preferably choose C as follows:
∗ Concrete, so that the entire wiretap scheme is
concrete.
∗ Efficient, so that the entire wiretap scheme is
efficient.
∗ Exceptionally reliable, so that the entire wiretap
scheme is exceptionally reliable.
• Use the finite field SS-UHF of Proposition 1 as the
pre/post processor of this wiretap scheme.
– One could use any SS-UHF in practice but it is
preferable to use one like ours that is concrete and
efficient.
Remark. Note that if ǫ is exponentially diminishing to 0 and
C is chosen exceptionally reliable then W is an outstanding
wiretap scheme.
V. APPLICATIONS I
In this section, we show how to actually use Procedure 1.
We apply Procedure 1 to both the discrete memoryless wiretap
channel (DMWC) and the memoryless additive white Gaussian
noise wiretap channel (AWGN). In particular, on the AWGN
and symmetric, degraded DMWCs, we achieve the semantic
secrecy capacity. Lastly, we explain how our scheme can be
applied in theory in the finite regime; i.e. we explain results
for finite n.
Before we begin, we will write max-information in a more
convenient form. This is both so that we can use the supporting
results of [8], but also because this alternative form will have
a better interpretation here.
Lemma 2. The ǫ-smooth max-information Iǫ∞(X
n ∧Zn) can
alternatively be written as the infimum of
log
∫
Zn
max
xn∈Cn
ωT (z
n|xn)µ(dzn)
over all (1 − ǫ)-typical sets T .
Proof. See Appendix D. 
A. Semantic security on a DMWC
For our first application of Theorem 2 and Procedure 1, we
consider DMWCs. This is the case when both the intended
receiver’s channel and the eavesdropper’s channel are given by
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distinct point-to-point discrete memoryless channels (DMC).
We represent the input signal by the discrete random variable
X , Bob’s output signal by the discrete random variable Y , and
Eve’s output signal by the discrete random variable Z .
Fact 3. (cf. [29]) The point-to-point capacity of a DMC with
input X and output Y is given as
C = max
PX
I(X ∧ Y ).
In particular we denote CT = maxPX I(X ∧Y ) and CE =
maxPX I(X ∧ Z). As described in Procedure 1, in order to
characterize a set of semantically secure rates, we need to
asymptotically bound the max-information per channel symbol
of Eve’s channel. The following lemma provides this bound.
Lemma 3. Using a reliable ECC scheme C, the max-
information per channel symbol of the DMC E is asymptoti-
cally bounded as
lim
n→∞
Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn)
n
≤ CE ,
where ǫ is exponentially decreasing to 0 with n.
Proof. Using Lemma 2 (where µ is the counting measure) we
can write
1
n
Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn) ≤ 1
n
log
∑
zn
max
xn∈Cn
ωT (z
n|xn),
for any (1− ǫ)-typical set T .
Luckily, [8, Lemma 5] proved a bound on this right hand
term for the same modular pre/post processing scheme less
our uniform requirement. Thus, by their result we immediately
have that there exists a constant c > 0 such that for ǫ = e−nc:
1
n
Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn) ≤ CE + 1
n
o(n)
where 1no(n) is a term diminishing to 0 as n → ∞. This
completes the claim asymptotically with n. 
With this bound we can apply Theorem 2.2 immediately
to describe the semantically secure rates our wiretap scheme
can achieve. However, in certain cases we can achieve the
secrecy capacity (with semantic security), i.e. the best possible
semantically secure rate. In order to describe this, let us recall
the following fact.
Fact 4. [30] The secrecy capacity of a DMWC where the
eavesdropper’s channel is noisier than the main channel and
both channels are weakly symmetric is given by
Cs = CT − CE .
With this fact, we can state our main result of this subsec-
tion, a characterization of semantically secure achievable rates
for the DMWC. Note that this result was already proven in [5]
and [6], but we restate this here to show the efficacy of our
proposed wiretap coding scheme and the fact that our proof
differs significantly.
Theorem 3.
1) On any DMWC, our wiretap scheme W can achieve all
secure rates,
Rs < (RC − CE)+,
with exceptional7 semantic security.
2) On a DMWC where both channels are weakly symmetric
and the eavesdropper’s channel is noisier than the main
channel we can achieve the secrecy capacity under ex-
ceptional semantic security when RC achieves the main
channel capacity CT .
Proof. This follows from Theorem 2.2 and Corollary 2 com-
bined with Lemma 3 and Fact 4. 
The first part of this proposition emphasizes that our wiretap
schemeW acts as a converter. If we input an ECC scheme for
the DMC (X , ω(y|x),Y) of rate RC > CE , then our procedure
converts that ECC scheme into an exceptionally semantically
secure wiretap code for a DMWC of rate Rs .
The second part of this proposition says that on degraded
symmetric DMWCs, our conversion respects the optimality of
rates. Specifically, it says that given an optimal ECC scheme,
i.e. an ECC scheme achieving the point-to-point main channel
capacity, our procedure converts this ECC scheme into an
exceptionally semantically secure wiretap code of optimal rate,
i.e. a wiretap scheme achieving the secrecy capacity.
With this, we again emphasize that our conversion is con-
crete and efficient. Thus, if the ECC scheme is such, so is
the entire wiretap scheme. Moreover, if the ECC scheme is
exceptionally reliable, the wiretap scheme is outstanding8.
B. Semantic security for AWGN wiretap channels
We consider now the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) memoryless wiretap channel where both the intended
receiver’s channel and eavesdropper’s channel are given by
distinct AWGN memoryless channels. We represent the input
signal by the real random variable X (where we suppose it
satisfies the average power constraint P ) and the additive white
Gaussian noise by the real random variable U . The channels
T and E can be described by their outputs given respectively
as
Y = X + UT
Z = X + UE .
The random variables UT and UE are assumed mutually
independent and sampled i.i.d. according to N (0, σ2T ) and
N (0, σ2E) respectively.
Fact 5. (cf. [29]) The capacity of an AWGN channel with
average input power constraint P and additive noise variance
σ2 is given by
C =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
σ2
)
.
In particular, this means the capacity of the intended re-
ceiver’s point-to-point channel is given by CT =
1
2 log(1+
P
σ2T
)
and the capacity of the eavesdropper’s point-to-point channel
is given by CE =
1
2 log(1 +
P
σ2E
).
7Recall that exceptional here means that the semantic leakage diminishes
to 0 exponentially fast with n.
8Recall the definition of an outstanding wiretap coding scheme from
Section II-D.
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Our goal of this subsection is to describe the semanti-
cally secure achievable rates that our wiretap scheme W can
achieve. Using Procedure 1 we already have a prescription of
how to do this by bounding the max-information per channel
symbol.
Lemma 4. Using a reliable ECC scheme C, the max-
information per channel symbol of an AWGN eavesdropper
channel E is asymptotically bounded as
lim
n→∞
Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn)
n
≤ CE ,
where ǫ is exponentially decreasing to 0 with n.
Proof. Using Lemma 2 (where µ is the Lebesgue measure)
we can write
1
n
Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn) ≤ 1
n
log
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
ωT (z
n|xn)dzn,
for any (1− ǫ)-typical set T .
Again, [8, Lemma 6] proved a bound on this right hand
term for the same modular pre/post processing scheme less
our uniform requirement. Thus, by their result we immediately
have the following bound for every δ > 0 small:
1
n
Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn) ≤ CE + δ log e + 1
n
o(n).
Here ǫ = exp(−nδn/8) and 1no(n) is a term diminishing to
0 as n→∞.
Since this holds for every δ > 0 this completes the claim
asymptotically with n. 
Remark. A reworked proof of [8, Lemma 6] can be found in
our Appendix D (Lemma D1). We feel it is worthwhile to see
the proof of this statement for the AWGN wiretap channel,
since later (specifically in Theorem 5 and Theorem 6), we
prove a more complicated analogous result for the No-CSIT
and partial CSIT wiretap channels.
Again, now that we have this bound in hand, we can apply
Theorem 2.2 to describe the semantically secure rates our
wiretap scheme can achieve. However, we notice that we can
actually achieve the best possible rates after considering the
following fact.
Fact 6. [31] On an AWGN wiretap channel W = (T,E), the
weak secrecy capacity is given as:
Cs =
{
CT − CE , if σ2T < σ2E
0, Otherwise.
Remark. This fact can be upgraded to strong secrecy using
the usual technique (cf. [17]). Only recently was this fact
upgraded to semantic secrecy [9].
Using this fact, we have the following main result of this
subsection.
Theorem 4.
1) On an AWGN wiretap channel, our wiretap scheme W
can achieve all secure rates
Rs < RC − CE
with exceptional semantic security as long as RC > CE .
2) In particular, when RC achieves the main channel ca-
pacity CT , then our wiretap scheme achieves the secrecy
capacity under exceptional semantic security.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 2.2 and Corollary 2 com-
bined with Lemma 4 and Fact 6. 
Remark. In an independent way from [9], Theorem 4.2 shows
that the semantic secrecy capacity is equivalent to the weak
secrecy capacity for the AWGN wiretap channel using Fact 1.
Note that W is exceptionally semantically secure so that if
C is also chosen to be exceptionally reliable, then our entire
wiretap coding scheme is outstanding9.
Indeed an ECC scheme is given in [32] that is concrete, re-
liable, and has quadratic time complexity with respect to block
length n in both encoding and decoding. Moreover, it has
probability of error exponentially decreasing to 0 so that it is
exceptionally reliable. Thus using this particular ECC scheme
with our SS-UHF implementation given in Proposition 1 gives
an end-to-end wiretap coding scheme for the AWGN wiretap
channel that is concrete, efficient, outstanding, semantically
secure, and can achieve the secrecy capacity.
Note that the wiretap scheme used in [9] has every single
one of these properties as well. However, their wiretap coding
scheme is based on polar lattices and is not modular. In
contrast, our scheme is modular: the exact same pre/post
processor used here (that is, the SS-UHF of Proposition 1)
can be used on any channel (discrete or continuous); one just
needs to find a reliable ECC scheme for the given point-to-
point channel.
C. Finite Analysis
Thus far we have exclusively focused on asymptotic analysis
of our wiretap scheme. Despite this, Corollary 1 gives an
extremely useful bound of security and rates in the finite
regime, that is, for a fixed finite coding blocklength n. We
do not pursue this line any further here, but for an interesting
look into finite block length analysis see Yang, Schaefer, and
Poor’s result [33] which also uses a UHF based scheme to
derive upper and lower bounds on the achievable rates in the
finite regime.
VI. APPLICATIONS II - FADING
In this section, we will consider even more applications of
Theorem 2 and Procedure 1, specifically, applications to fading
wiretap channels. Fading wiretap channels are the prototypical
physical layer security models of wireless communication.
9Again recall the definition of an outstanding wiretap coding scheme from
Section II-D.
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It is standard to assume some feedback of channel state
information to Alice that will help her deduce the current fade
and increase her overall secure transmission rate. In this sense
it is obvious that fading wiretap channels are only a particular
instance of a much more general case of wiretap channels:
wiretap channels with side information. Side information is
any information in the form of a random variable available to
Alice before transmission that may be advantageous. In this
way, it may help her induce more reliability or security, which
in turn may help her ascertain a higher secure achievable rate.
Hence, by studying wiretap channels with side information,
we are inherently considering fading wiretap channels by
inclusion.
To study wiretap channels with side information we will first
need to manipulate the language we have introduced thus far.
Let Λn ∈ Hn represent the n pieces of side information that
may be advantageous to the transmitter. Because we always
deal in the worst case for security, it is necessary to assume
that the eavesdropper also knows Λn, thus we will need to
convert the previously defined security metrics in the obvious
way to account for this. However, as is a common trick in
fading, we can consider the entire tuple (Zn,Λn) to be the
eavesdropper’s output instead of only Zn as before. Thus, for
wiretap channels with side information, the semantic security
metric has its leakage given by maxPM I(M ∧ Zn,Λn).
With this trick, we can also consider our main result,
Theorem 2, redone for side information, however, we will
only need part 2 and part 3 of that theorem.
Corollary 3 (Theorem 2 redux). Using W with a reliable
deterministic ECC C on any wiretap channel W = (T,E),
if ǫ is chosen such that ǫn → 0 as n → ∞ we have the
following.
• If limn→∞
1
nI
ǫ
∞(X
n ∧ Zn,Λn) ≤ ξ then10
Rs <
(
RC − ξ
)+
using semantic security.
• If ǫ is exponentially diminishing to 0 with n, then for
any secure rates above, W is exceptionally semantically
secure. In particular, if C is exceptionally reliable, then
W is an outstanding semantically secure wiretap scheme.
Remark.
• We call this a corollary due to the numerous references
hereafter; however, it is in itself just Theorem 2 in the
case where side information is present.
• Recall that Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn,Λn) is defined as the infimum
of IT∞(X
n ∧ Zn,Λn) over all (1 − ǫ)-typical sets T . To
be precise, we note that now T ⊂ Cn ×Hn ×Zn.
It will be beneficial in the sequel to characterize IT∞(X
n ∧
Zn,Λn) in the following way.
10As a reminder, (·)+ = max( · , 0).
Lemma 5. Let Xn be a random variable over Cn and Λ
n be
some side information. If Xn⊥Λn then
IT∞(X
n ∧ Zn,Λn)
= log
(
EΛn
∫
Zn
max
xn∈Cn
ωT (z
n|Λn, xn)µ(dzn)
)
.
Proof. See Appendix F. 
Remark. IndeedXn⊥Λn seems to be a restrictive assumption,
however, it is not, as the forthcoming proofs will make clear.
Until this point, we have been general with respect to
side information. We really do allow any extra information
available to the transmitter that could be used to aide in a
higher secure rate. However, we will now be focusing on
fading wiretap channels, that is, when side information is a
tuple of fading coefficients.
A. Fading Preliminaries
The general channel model used to model wireless com-
munication environments is that of the fading channel, where
the output signal is an attenuation of the input signal layered
with additive white Gaussian noise. The attenuation, input, and
noise are represented using the complex random variables H ,
X , and U respectively. The output of this channel at time i is
then given as
Yi = HiXi + Ui
where Xi ∈ C, Hi ∈ C, and Ui ∼ CN (0, σ2). Here,
CN (0, σ2) is a circularly-symmetric normal distribution with
0 mean and variance σ2. We shall refer to the random variable
representing attenuation, H , as the channel coefficient.
For the purposes of this paper, we will only be considering
fast fading channels, that is, the fading coefficient is sampled
i.i.d. for each use of the channel (cf. [34]). In particular, we
will consider the case of fast fading wiretap channels, i.e.,
channels T and E are both taken to be fast fading channels.
More specifically, during the i-th symbol of the codeword, the
output at Bob from channel T and the output at Eve from
channel E are given respectively by
Yi = HT,iXi + UT,i
Zi = HE,iXi + UE,i,
where UT,i and UE,i are i.i.d. CN (0, σ2T ) and CN (0, σ2E)
additive noise respectively, Xi ∈ C is subject to the power
constraint E
[|X |2] ≤ P ′, and the coefficients HT,i, HE,i ∈ C
are also i.i.d. and HT,i⊥HE,j for all i, j. For technical reasons
we assume that the second order moment of |HE | exists,
i.e., E[|HE |2] < ∞. We note that this is not a very limiting
constraint since it can be interpreted as the channel having
an attenuation with finite energy. Apart from this, we do not
assume which distribution the channel coefficients follow so
as to remain as general as possible. Note that this is in contrast
to much of the fast fading literature that a priori assumes a
distribution on both HT and HE .
Achievability results for fading channels depend on which
parties have instantaneous access to the realizations of HT,i
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and HE,i, or rather, which parties have full channel state
information. If a party only has access to the statistics of HT,i
or HE,i we say that party has no channel state information.
Fact 7. On a complex fast fading channel, if the receiver has
full channel state information (CSIR) then the channel can be
decomposed into two real parallel channels.
Proof. See Appendix F for the usual proof. 
For the remainder of this paper, we will assume both
the intended receiver and the eavesdropper have full channel
state information (CSIR) about their respective channels. In
particular, this means that we will only be considering the real
fast fading channels given at time i as Yi = |HT,i|Xi + UT,i
and Zi = |HE,i|Xi+UE,i due to Fact 7. Since carrying around
the modulus on the channel coefficients is cumbersome, we
shall simply write HT and HE for the remainder of the paper
where it will be clear that both are non-negative real random
variables instead of complex as previously mentioned. An
illustration of our setup is given in Figure 2.
Xi
× + Yi
HT,i UT,i
× + Zi
HE,i UE,i
Fig. 2. Fast fading wiretap channel model.
Thus far, we have made no assumptions as to what infor-
mation the transmitter has about the channel coefficients HT
and HE . We shall notate full channel state information at the
transmitter by CSIT and will focus on three separate cases. The
first case we will consider is No-CSIT where the transmitter
has knowledge only of the main channel and eavesdropper
channel statistics. Next we will consider partial CSIT, where
the transmitter has instantaneous knowledge of the main
channel’s realizations of HT at each time i but no knowledge
of the eavesdropper’s instantaneous channel coefficient - only
its statistics. Finally, we will consider full CSIT, where the
transmitter has instantaneous knowledge of both the main
channel’s and eavesdropper channel’s realizations of HT and
HE respectively.
For each of these scenarios, we wish to characterize a set of
achievable secure rates. To do so, we utilize Corollary 3 with
Lemma 5 where we take the side information to be Λn =
(HnT , H
n
E).
B. Fading: No-CSIT
The case of No-CSIT, where the transmitter knows only the
channel statistics of both the main and eavesdropper channels,
is arguably the most realistic scenario of a modern wireless
communication environment. It requires no special real-time
feedback implementation for the main channel and assumes
that the eavesdropper is purely a malicious party (although
still passive). Under this assumption, in this subsection we
give a set of semantically secure achievable rates for the
fast fading wiretap channel. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, this is the first time semantic security has been
characterized on the fast fading wiretap channel with No-CSIT
in general. To do so, we find an asymptotic upper bound,
ξ, to the leakage max-information per channel symbol, i.e.,
1
nI
ǫ
∞(X
n∧Zn, HnT , HnE), for any choice of code so as to use
Corollary 3 and Procedure 1. In particular, we will be focused
on ξ = CE , where CE denotes the point-to-point channel
capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel.
We start by first simplifying the expression for max-
information of Lemma 5 in the case of No-CSIT.
Lemma 6. On the No-CSIT real fast fading channel, max-
information can be simplified as
IT∞(X
n ∧ Zn, HnT , HnE)
= log
EHnE ∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
ωT (z
n|xn, HnE)dzn
 ,
where Xn is a random variable over Cn.
Proof. See Appendix F. 
With codeword power constraint P and noise variance σ2,
we note the following fact.
Fact 8. [34] The point-to-point capacity of a real fast fading
channel with No-CSIT is given by
C =
1
2
EH
[
log
(
1 +H2
P
σ2
)]
,
where H is the random variable representing the channel
coefficient.
To this end, our goal for the remainder of this section will
be to show
lim
n→∞
ǫ→0
Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn, HnT , HnE)
n
≤ 1
2
EHE
[
log(1 +H2ESNR)
]
such that SNR denotes the eavesdropper’s average signal to
noise ratio P/σ2E . In particular, we need to show the above
holds for some (1−ǫ)-typical set T such that ǫ is exponentially
decreasing to 0 as n→∞.
We begin by constructing such a set T and showing that
it is typical in an exponential fashion with respect to n. The
set is made up of three constituent sets; one each concerning
the output power, noise power, and eavesdropper channel
coefficient power.
We define11 the following sets for δn, δ
′
n, δ
′′
n > 0 small:
• P1n as the set of tuples (hnE , zn) ∈ Rn+ × Rn such that
1
n
n∑
i=1
z2i
σ2E + h
2
E,iP
− 1 ≤ δn,
11Motivation for defining these typical sets is based on a sphere packing
argument and can be found in Appendix E.
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• P2n as the set of zn ∈ Rn that satisfy
‖zn − xnhnE‖2 ≥ nσ2E(1− δ′n)
given a fixed xn ∈ Cn and hnE ∈ Rn+,
• P3n as the set of hnE ∈ Rn+ that satisfy∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
log
(
1 + h2E,iSNR
)− EHE [1 +H2ESNR]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ′′n.
Intuitively, P1n corresponds to the set of eavesdropper output
powers and channel coefficients most likely to occur in con-
junction. P2n corresponds to the least amount of noise added
to hnEx
n during transmission. P3n corresponds to the set of
eavesdropper channel coefficients that we expect to occur and
is needed for technical reasons. The following lemma proves
that events from each of these sets occur with sufficiently high
probability.
Lemma 7. Consider12 the constant c = 1/(4K∗) > 0.
1) Let ǫ1n = 2e
−ncδ2n . For any xn ∈ Cn,
P
[
(HnE , Z
n) ∈ P1n
∣∣∣∣Xn = xn] ≥ 1− ǫ1n.
2) Let ǫ2n = e
−n4 δ
′
n
2
. For any xn ∈ Cn and hnE ∈ Rn+,
P
[
Zn ∈ P2n
∣∣∣∣Xn = xn, HnE = hnE] ≥ 1− ǫ2n.
3) Let ǫ3n = 2e
−ncδ′′n
2
. Then,
P
[
HnE ∈ P3n
] ≥ 1− ǫ3n.
Proof. See Appendix G. 
We now use the sets constructed above to create our typical
set. Define each of the following sets:
T 1n = {(xn, hnE , zn) : xn ∈ Cn and (hnE , zn) ∈ P1n},
T 2n = {(xn, hnE , zn) : xn ∈ Cn, hnE ∈ Rn+, and zn ∈ P2n},
T 3n = {(xn, hnE , zn) ∈ Cn × P3n × Rn}.
We can think of each of these three sets as the expansion
set that corresponds to each of the previous three sets P1n,
P2n, and P3n but lives in the space Cn × Rn+ × Rn, the
tuple of all codewords, eavesdropper channel coefficients, and
eavesdropper outputs.
We now take the intersection of these sets to construct one
final set
Tn = T 1n ∩ T 2n ∩ T 3n .
The following lemma shows that the tuple of main channel
coefficients and the previous set, Rn+ × Tn, is typical for any
n. The main channel coefficients must be taken into account
as well since we are on a fast fading wiretap channel but we
will see shortly that in the case of No-CSIT, it plays little part.
Lemma 8. Let ǫn = ǫ
1
n + ǫ
2
n + ǫ
3
n then
P
[
(HnT , X
n, HnE , Z
n) ∈ Rn+ × Tn|Xn = xn
] ≥ 1− ǫn,
12K∗ is a parameter of the channel defined in Appendix G, Fact 12.
for any xn ∈ Cn. That is, Rn+ × Tn is a (1 − ǫn)-typical set
where ǫn is exponentially decreasing to 0 as n→∞.
Proof. See Appendix G. 
With our typical set Rn+×Tn in hand, we are ready to prove
the main result of this section and determine a characterization
for semantically secure achievable rates for the fast fading
wiretap channel with No-CSIT.
Theorem 5. Consider the fast fading wiretap channel with
No-CSIT and let Tn and ǫn be defined as in Lemma 8. It
follows that:
lim
n→∞
ǫ→0
Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn, HnT , HnE)
n
≤ 1
2
EHE
[
log(1 +H2ESNR)
]
.
Proof. See Appendix G. 
The following corollary then tells us what semantically
secure rates we can achieve given this bound.
Corollary 4. The wiretap coding scheme of Section III can
achieve an overall semantic secrecy rate of CT − CE on the
No-CSIT fast fading wiretap channel when CT > CE and RC
is chosen arbitrarily close to CT .
Proof. We can combine the previous theorem with Corollary 3
and note that δn, δ
′
n, δ
′′
n can be chosen in such a way that
ǫn → 0 exponentially as n→∞. 
Note that to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the
best semantically secure achievable rate on a No-CSIT fast
fading wiretap channel to date. Going further, we actually have
achieved the secrecy capacity for a specific class of wiretap
channels.
Fact 9. [14] The weak secrecy capacity of a stochastically
degraded fast fading wiretap channel with No-CSIT is given
by
CS = CT − CE .
Immediately this fact with the previous corollary implies
that we can achieve the secrecy capacity with our wiretap
coding scheme of Section III on stochastically degraded fast
fading channels with No-CSIT.
Corollary 5. Using the wiretap coding scheme of Section III
on any fast fading stochastically degraded wiretap channel
with No-CSIT we have the following:
1) It is possible to achieve the semantic secrecy capacity.
2) Cs
∣∣
weak
= Cs
∣∣
semantic
.
C. Fading: Partial CSIT
We now turn to the case of partial CSIT, where the trans-
mitter has access to full CSI about the main channel but
knows only the statistics of Eve’s channel. Our goal in this
subsection is the same as in the previous subsection - we wish
to characterize a set of semantically secure rates for the wiretap
channel at hand and we use Corollary 3 to do so.
Since the transmitter has access to CSI about the main
channel, every party can demultiplex the fast fading wiretap
channel into a set of d parallel channels by partitioning the
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channel coefficients of the main channel into d intervals as
done in [17], [35]. Each parallel wiretap channel is then
composed of a time-invariant, constant gain Gaussian main
channel with a fast fading eavesdropper channel characterized
by HE as depicted in Figure 3.
A
HT
B
HE
E
⇒
A
hT,1 B
HE
E·
·
·
·
·
A
hT,d B
HE
E
Fig. 3. Decomposition of the fast fading wiretap channel with partial CSIT.
More specifically, we assume the fading gain of the main
channel is bounded as usual and divide the possible realiza-
tions of HT into intervals [hT,i, hT,i+1) with i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Let
pi = P [HT ∈ [hT,i, hT,i+1 )] .
Let Ni be the random variable representing the number of
times channel i is actually used, i.e., the number of times
hT,i belongs to the i-th interval over all n channel uses. Let
ni = pin−εi be a real number, where εi is chosen sufficiently
large so that Ni is greater than ni with high probability and
εi → 0 as n→∞. In short, ni represents the number of times
we plan on the channel coefficients being realized in the i-th
interval, whereas the realization of Ni is how many times the
the channel coefficients actually do occur in the i-th interval.
For every index i, the transmitter and legitimate receiver will
publicly agree on a transmit power γi(HT ) where {γi}di=1 is
chosen such that
d∑
i=1
piγi ≤ P.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ d, the transmitter and legitimate receiver
also publicly agree upon an ECC Cini (with codebook C ini )
designed to operate on the Gaussian point-to-point channel
with constant channel gain hT,i. We denote by Ri the rate of
Cini and the overall rate over the main channel to be
RCn =
d∑
i=1
piRi.
The full coding scheme is then outlined as follows: a message
m ∈ M is chosen which passes through the preprocessing
layer to produce an l-length pseudo-message m′ ∈ M′. These
l bits are then divided into sets of niRi bits such that
l =
∑
i
niRi.
A codeword is then generated for each of these sets by their
respective Cini and the multiplexing strategy outlined in [17],
[35] is then employed to transmit the ith codeword when the
channel state is in the ith interval. In more detail, at each time
instant i the multiplexer will determine what the channel state
is and send one symbol from the codeword associated with
that channel gain.
The reliability of this scheme comes from the aggregate
reliability of all the ECC’s being employed on the d parallel
channels and the fact that we are choosing ni < Ni with high
probability. Since we are assuming an ECC Cini is chosen to
be reliable over the ith point-to-point main channel, we know
that the probability of error will be negligible:
Pe(Cini)→ 0 as ni →∞.
In other words, the receiver will be able to recover each ni-
length codeword with high probability. Thus the probability
of error for the entire n-length transmission is just probability
of error for each individual ni-length codeword weighted by
the probability that that code is used:
Pe(Cn) =
d∑
i
piPe(Cini)→
d∑
i
pi · 0 = 0 as n→∞
since ni grows with n. Now that this scheme has been shown
to be reliable, we now address its security.
We wish to asymptotically bound 1nI
ǫ
∞(X
n∧Zn, HnT , HnE)
of this fast fading channel by considering the set of d parallel
wiretap channels outlined above and each of their individual
associated max-information terms for which we already know
the bound found in Theorem 5. This is due to the fact
that Theorem 5 did not impose any restrictions on the main
channel distribution, it only required Eve’s channel to be given
arbitrarily as HE . Thus having a constant gain main channel
and no CSIT of Eve’s channel is a special case of No-CSIT.
The only way this differs from that of Section VI-B is that
in the case of No-CSIT, we are not allowed to vary the
power we are transmitting at due to our lack of knowledge
of instantaneous CSIT, whereas in the case of partial CSIT,
we can vary our power to align with what the current main
channel gain is.
Similarly to the case of No-CSIT, we wish to create a typical
set which will contain enough content about our space of
inputs, outputs, and channel coefficients. We accomplish this
by creating typical sets for each of the d subchannels and
taking the Cartesian product of these to generate the typical
set for the entire wiretap channel.
Define the following sets:
T ′ni ={(xni , hniT , hniE , zni) : hniT ∈ Rni+ , (xni , hniE , zni)∈ Tni}
T ′n =
⊗
i
T ′ni
where Tni is defined in Section VI-B.
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Lemma 9. T ′n as defined above is a (1−ǫn) typical set where
ǫn is exponentially decreasing with n.
Proof. See Appendix H. 
With the typical set T ′n in hand, we now aim to find an
asymptotic bound ξ for the average max-information for the
entire n uses of the wiretap channel W .
Theorem 6. Consider a fast fading wiretap channel where
the transmitter has partial CSIT with T ′n and ǫn as defined
in Lemma 9. Using the multiplexing scheme above, it follows
that:
lim
n→∞
ǫ→0
(
Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn, HnT , HnE)
n
)
≤ 1
2
EHEHT
[
log
(
1 +
γ(HT )H
2
E
σ2E
)]
.
Proof. See Appendix H. 
Now that we have found ξ, Corollary 3 immediately tells us
that by using the SS-UHF based preprocessing scheme we can
achieve any positive rate, Rs, with semantic security satisfying
Rs < RC − 1
2
EHEHT
[
log
(
1 +
γ(HT )H
2
E
σ2E
)]
.
Let’s see how this compares to previous results.
Fact 10. [12], [17] For the fast fading wiretap channel
where the CSI of the main channel but not the CSI of the
eavesdropper channel is known at the transmitter, all rates
Rs such that
Rs < max
γ
(
1
2
EHT
[
log
(
1 +
γ(HT )H
2
T
σ2T
)]
+ · · ·
· · · − 1
2
EHTHE
[
log
(
1 +
γ(HT )H
2
E
σ2E
)])
where γ : R+ → R+ obeys the constraint E [γ(HT )] ≤ P are
achievable secrecy rates under the strong (and weak) secrecy
metric.
To the extent of the authors’ knowledge, the secure achiev-
able rates given in Fact 10 have never been extended to
semantic security. However, the next corollary remedies this.
Corollary 6. The wiretap coding scheme of Section III can
achieve all rates given in Fact 10 with semantic security on
the partial CSIT fast fading wiretap channel when the rate of
the ECC, RC , is taken arbitrarily close to
1
2
EHT
[
log
(
1 +
γ(HT )H
2
T
σ2T
)]
for any power allocation γ(HT ). Moreover, these rates are
achieved with exceptional semantic security.
Proof. The result follows immediately after combining Corol-
lary 3 with Theorem 6 and noting that there does exist some
ECC which can achieve this rate due to the fact that the above
expression is less than or equal to the point-to-point capacity
of the fast fading channel. 
D. Fading: Full CSIT
In this subsection, we shall assume full CSIT; that is, we
assume the transmitter knows instantaneously the realizations
at time instance i of both the main and eavesdropper channel
coefficients. The strategy used to find a set of semantically
secure rates in this scenario is almost identical to that used in
Section VI-C thus we omit most of the redundant explanations
and proofs here. We now demultiplex the wiretap channel
into d2 parallel constant gain Gaussian wiretap channels
determined by the channel coefficients of both channel T and
channel E. Since each of the parallel wiretap channels are
now Gaussian wiretap channels, we no longer use the bounds
found in Theorem 5, but rather use the bounds from Lemma 4
to bound the max-information of each of the parallel wiretap
channels.
As before, we define a typical set for this channel as the
Cartesian product of simpler sets:
⋆T 1nij = {(xnij , h
nij
T , h
nij
E , z
nij) :
h
nij
T ∈ Rnij+ , (xnij , hnijE , znij) ∈ T 1nij},
⋆T 2nij = {(xnij , h
nij
T , h
nij
E , z
nij) :
h
nij
T ∈ Rnij+ , (xnij , hnijE , znij) ∈ T 2nij},
T ′nij =
⋆T 1nij ∩
⋆T 2nij ,
T ′n =
⊗
i,j
T ′nij .
Note that T 1nij and T 2nij are defined in Section VI-B. The
following lemma, which is analogous to Lemma 9 from
Section VI-C, shows that T ′n is a typical set.
Lemma 10. T ′n as defined above is a (1 − ǫn) typical set
where ǫn is exponentially decreasing with n.
Now in an analogous way to Theorem 5 and Theorem 6,
we have the following theorem for the full CSIT scenario.
Theorem 7. Consider the fast fading wiretap channel with
full CSIT at the transmitter with T ′n and ǫn as defined in
Lemma 10. Using the multiplexing scheme above, it follows
that:
lim
n→∞
ǫ→0
(
Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn, HnT , HnE)
n
)
≤ 1
2
EHE ,HT
[
log
(
1 +
γ(HT , HE)H
2
E
σ2E
)]
.
Now that we have found the bound ξ, Corollary 3 again
tells us that by using the SS-UHF based preprocessing scheme
we can achieve any positive rate, Rs, with semantic security
satisfying
Rs < RC − 1
2
EHE ,HT
[
log
(
1 +
γ(HT , HE)H
2
E
σ2E
)]
.
Once again, let’s see how this compares to previous results.
Fact 11. With full CSI for both the main channel and the
eavesdropper channels available at the transmitter, the strong
secrecy capacity of the fast fading wiretap channel is:
Cs = max
γ
(
1
2
EHTHE
[
log
(
1 +
γ(HT , HE)H
2
T
σ2T
)]
+ · · ·
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· · · − 1
2
EHTHE
[
log
(
1 +
γ(HT , HE)H
2
E
σ2E
)])
where γ : R2+ → R+ obeys the power constraint
E [γ(HT , HE)] ≤ P .
This fact was originally given in [10] under the weak
security metric but was upgraded to the strong security metric
in [11]. However, to the extent of the authors’ knowledge,
this result has never been upgraded to semantic security. We
provide such a generalization in the next corollary.
Corollary 7. The semantic secrecy capacity of the fast fading
wiretap channel with full CSIT is given by:
Cs =max
γ
(
1
2
EHTHE
[
log
(
1 +
γ(HT , HE)H
2
T
σ2T
)]
· · ·
· · · − 1
2
EHTHE
[
log
(
1 +
γ(HT , HE)H
2
E
σ2E
)])
.
Furthermore, the transmission scheme of Section III can
achieve the semantic secrecy capacity of the fast fading
wiretap channel with full CSIT exceptionally fast.
Proof. Let γ∗ be the power allocation function that maximizes
the expression in Fact 11 as found in [10]. Let the rate of the
ECC, RC , be taken arbitrarily close to
1
2
EHTHE
[
log
(
1 +
γ∗(HT , HE)H
2
T
σ2T
)]
.
We know by Shannon’s noisy channel coding theorem that
some ECC will exist which satisfies this rate due to the
above expression being less than or equal to the point-to-
point capacity of the main fast fading channel. Since the bound
found in Theorem 7 holds for any power allocation function γ,
it holds for γ∗ in particular. In Theorem 7 we found an upper
bound to the right hand term of the difference in Fact 11,
thus invoking Corollary 3 we know we can achieve any rate
arbitrarily close to the secrecy capacity given in Fact 11.
Therefore the semantic secrecy capacity is equal to the weak
secrecy capacity by Fact 1 in the case of full CSIT and the
given wiretap coding scheme achieves it. 
VII. FUTURE WORK
For wiretap channels that do not fall into the purview of the
previously listed channels, one must apply Procedure 1 in its
entirety. Hopefully however, the proof techniques employed
here will help guide those pursuits.
As another interesting line of future work, one may try
to find a tighter upper bound ξ to the max-information per
channel symbol on the fast fading wiretap channel with No-
CSIT. Indeed, we proved the case when ξ = CE (the capacity
of the eavesdropper’s point-to-point channel), but perhaps this
can be improved by clever power allocation techniques.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The main purpose of this paper has been to amplify the
results of physical layer security into a more practical setting.
In particular, we have developed a concrete and efficient con-
verter that takes as input an error correcting code and outputs
a semantically secure wiretap code. We have addressed five
separate wiretap channels that are arguably the most popular in
literature and have shown for each which semantically secure
rates are achievable.
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APPENDIX A
OUR CONSTRUCTION IS AN EFFICIENT SS-UHF: PROOF OF
PROPOSITION 1 AND PROPOSITION 2
In this beginning appendix, we will prove that our UHF
construction based on finite field arithmetic is an SS-UHF
(Proposition 1) and that it is efficient (Proposition 2).
Proof of Proposition 1
We will show F∗ is universal, uniform, (l − k)-regular, and
evenly invertible.
• Universality: Fix m′1 6= m′2 ∈ M′. We wish to count
how many (s, t) satisfy:
[(s⊙m′1)⊕ t]k = [(s⊙m′2)⊕ t]k .
Since ⊕ is equivalent to bitwise addition, we can dis-
tribute [·]k and reduce the equation to:
[s⊙m′1]k ⊕k [t]k = [s⊙m′2]k ⊕k [t]k
where ⊕k is addition over GF (2k). This reduces even
further to [s ⊙ m′1]k = [s ⊙ m′2]k, however, this is an
equation that does not involve t so that indeed, any choice
of t satisfies the original equation. This equation can be
rewritten as
0k = [s⊙m′1]k ⊕k [s⊙m′2]k
= [(s⊙m′1)⊕ (s⊙m′2)]k
= [s⊙m′′]k
where we have definedm′′ = m′1⊕m′2. Now since m′1 6=
m′2 then m
′′ = m′1⊕m′2 6= 0l. Moreover, by assumption
s 6= 0l so that for each choice of s, the multiplication
s ⊙ m′′ is a unique element in {0, 1}l \ 0l. Note that
since there are 2l−k − 1 elements in {0, 1}l \ 0l where
the first k bits set to 0, then there are 2l−k − 1 choices
of s that satisfy 0k = [s ⊙m′′]k. In summary, we have
2l choices for t and 2−k(2l − 2k) choices for s, thus we
have 2−k2l(2l − 2k) choices for (s, t) that satisfy [(s ⊙
m′1)⊕ t]k = [(s⊙m′2)⊕ t]k. However, 2−k2l(2l−2k) ≤
2−k2l(2l−1) since k ≥ 1 so that (noting |S| = 2l(2l−1))
we have proved that F∗ is a universal hash family.
• Uniformity: Fix m′ ∈M′ andm ∈ M. We wish to count
how many (s, t) satisfy:
[(s⊙m′)⊕ t]k = m.
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We can distribute [·]k and view this as the equation
[t]k = m ⊕k [s ⊙ m′]k. For each choice of s the first
k bits of t are fixed and the last l − k bits are free;
thus there are 2l−k choices for t. Since there are no
restrictions at all on s, we can choose any of the 2l − 1
l-length bits strings (excluding 0l) for s. In aggregate
there are 2l−k(2l − 1) choices of (s, t) that satisfy
[(s⊙m′)⊕ t]k = m. Noting again that |S| = 2l(2l − 1)
we have proven that our family F∗ is uniform.
• Regularity: Fix some m ∈ M, s ∈ {0, 1}l \ 0l, and
t ∈ {0, 1}l. We wish to count how many m′ satisfy:
[(s⊙m′)⊕ t]k = m.
As usual, break up this equation to [s⊙m′]k = m⊕k [t]k.
Since we are working in GF (2l) and s 6= 0l, for each
choice of m′ ∈ {0, 1}l the product s ⊙ m′ will be a
unique element in {0, 1}l. But by the previous equation,
the first k bits of s⊙m′ are fixed at m⊕k [t]k while the
last l − k bits are completely free. Hence there will be
2l−k choices of m′ that satisfy the original equation.
Therefore, F∗ is (l − k)-regular.
• Invertibility: Letm ∈ M, s ∈ {0, 1}l\0l, and t ∈ {0, 1}l.
Then,
fs,t(φs,t,R(m)) = [s⊙
(
s−1 ⊙ ((m||R)⊕ t))⊕ t]k
= [(m||R)⊕ t⊕ t]k
= [m||R]k
= m.
Hence, F∗ is invertible.
• Even Invertibility: Suppose we are given a m ∈ M,
s ∈ {0, 1}l \ 0l, and t ∈ {0, 1}l. Then φs,t,r(m) =(
s−1 ⊙ (m||r) ⊕ t) is a unique element for every choice
of r. Since R ∼ unif({0, 1}l−k) the pseudo-message
M ′ = φs,t,R(M) will be uniform.
In summary, we have proven that F∗ is an SS-UHF, thus
concluding the proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2
First recall that l and k are functions of the block length n.
1) Concatenation has time complexity O(k + (l − k)) and
thus is linear with n: O(k + (l − k)) = O(l) =
O(nRCn) = O(n). Addition in GF (2l) operates as
bitwise addition (or XOR) and thus the time complexity is
also linear with n: O(l) = O(nRCn) = O(n). Therefore,
the operation (m||r) ⊕ t has linear time complexity.
Now inversion and multiplication in GF (2l) is known
to be computed in at worst quadratic time in l (cf.
[36, Chapter 2]). Thus computing the entire inverse
s−1 ⊙ ((m||r) ⊕ t) is O(n2).
2) Using the same arguments as above, the operation m′⊙s
can be implemented in quadratic time and addition can
be implemented in linear time. Clearly, [·]k can be imple-
mented in O(k) = O(n): linear time with n. Thus, the
entire post-processing scheme also can be implemented
in quadratic time in n.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 2. 
APPENDIX B
SECURITY AND RATES: PROOF OF THEOREM 1 AND
THEOREM 2
In this appendix, we will prove the two main statements
related to the security and achievable rates of our wiretap
coding scheme of Section III. Before we begin, we will need
the following lemma. Not only do we use it several times in
the proofs of the aforementioned results, but also, this lemma
justifies our definition of α-mutual information as we required
M ′ to be uniform there.
Lemma B1. The pseudo-message M ′ is a uniform random
variable over the set M′ where |M′| = 2l, i.e., ω(m′) = 2−l.
Proof. We claim that M ′ is a uniform random variable over
the set M′ = {0, 1}l. We already argued in Section III
that given m and s, M ′ is a uniform random variable over
supp(φs(m)), hence, we simply need to show that ω(m
′) =
2−l. Consider the following string of equalities:
ω(m′)
1
=
∑
m∈M
∑
s∈S
ω(m′,m, s)
2
=
∑
m∈M
∑
s∈S
ω(m′|m, s)PM (m)PS(s)
3
= 2−b
∑
m∈M
PM (m)
(
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
1 (m = fs(m
′))
)
4
= 2−l
∑
m∈M
PM (m)
= 2−l.
Justification.
1) Marginal density properties.
2) M⊥S by assumption.
3) ω(m′|m, s) = 2−b1 (m = fs(m′)) as mentioned in Sec-
tion III.
4) The term
(
1
|S|
∑
s∈S 1 (m = fs(m
′))
)
= 2−k for anym ∈
M and m′ ∈M′ by the uniform property of our SS-UHF.
Moreover b = l − k.
This concludes the proof of Lemma B1. 
Proof of Theorem 1
This theorem is the primary tool of this paper. The proof is
similar at times to the proof given in [8] (for the analogous
result for strong security only) and is a very straightforward
application of our SS-UHF to the definition of mutual informa-
tion. Notwithstanding, the proof is rather long and as a point
of convenience we note that the proof ends on page 24.
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We first need the following fact which follows immediately
from the chain rule of mutual information:
max
PM
I(M ∧ Zn) ≤ max
PM
I(M ∧ Zn, S).
Thus, it is sufficient to bound maxPM I(M ∧ Zn, S).
We will split the proof into two parts, ǫ > 0 and ǫ = 0,
starting with the ǫ = 0 case. As mentioned previously, 1-
typical sets T are equal to the entire space M′ × Zn less a
set of measure 0, so that I0α(M
′ ∧ Zn) = Iα(M ′ ∧ Zn). To
show our claim is valid, it is therefore sufficient in the case
of ǫ = 0 to show:
max
PM
I(M ∧ Zn, S) ≤ 1
ln 2
2
1
2 (−b+I2(M
′∧Zn)).
To begin, suppose M has some arbitrary distribution. Since
S and M are finite the definition of conditional mutual
information I(M ∧ Zn|S) is given by∫
Zn
∑
m∈M
∑
s∈S
ω(m, zn, s) log
(
ω(m, zn|s)
ω(m|s)ω(zn|s)
)
µ(dzn),
where µ is some measure on Zn.
From the chain rule of mutual information, since M⊥S by
assumption, we have I(M ∧ Zn, S) = I(M ∧ Zn|S). It then
follows that
I(M ∧ Zn, S)
= I(M ∧ Zn|S)
=
∫
Zn
∑
m∈M
∑
s∈S
ω(m, zn, s) log
(
ω(m, zn|s)
ω(m|s)ω(zn|s)
)
µ(dzn)
=
∫
Zn
∑
m∈M
∑
s∈S
ω(m, zn, s) log
(
ω(zn|m, s)
ω(zn|s)
)
µ(dzn). (1)
Let us now expand each conditional density of the numera-
tor and denominator of the logarithm in Equation (1). Starting
with the numerator we have:
ω(zn|m, s) =
∑
m′∈supp(φs(m))
ω(zn|m′)ω(m′|m, s) (2)
= 2−b
∑
m′∈supp(φs(m))
ω(zn|m′) (3)
= 2−b
∑
m′∈M′
ω(zn|m′)1 (fs(m′) = m) . (4)
Equation (2) follows from the fact that we can take M ′ as
an intermediate node and sum over all possible realizations of
M ′; by assumption, since we are given m and s, then M ′ can
only be found in supp(φs(m)) where φs is the even-inverse
of fs. Equation (3) follows from the fact that once given m
and s, the density of M ′ is uniform on a set with 2b elements
which follows from the fact that our SS-UHF is b-regular and
evenly invertible.
The expansion of the conditional density in the denominator
of the logarithm of Equation (1) is given by:
ω(zn|s) = ω(z
n, s)
PS(s)
1
=
∑
m∈M
ω(zn,m, s)PM (m)
PS(s)PM (m)
2
=
∑
m∈M
ω(zn|m, s)PM (m)
= 2−b
∑
m′∈M′
ω(zn|m′)
∑
m∈M
PM (m)1(fs(m
′) = m)
3
= 2−b
∑
m′∈M′
ω(zn|m′)PM (fs(m′)). (5)
Justification.
1) Marginal density property.
2) By assumption, M⊥S.
3) When s is fixed, fs is a well defined function. Thus, inside
the sum over M′, fs(m′) can map to only a single m ∈
M. Therefore, the indicator is 1 only for a single value
of m; namely, when m = fs(m
′).
We now continue expanding the leakage (Equation (1))
using these two conditional densities.
I(M ∧ Zn, S)
4
=
∫
Zn
∑
m∈M
∑
s∈S
ω(m, zn, s) · · ·
· · · log
2−b∑u′∈M′ ω(zn|u′)1(fs(u′) = m)
2−b
∑
u′′∈M′
ω(zn|u′′)PM (fs(u′′))
µ(dzn)
5
=
∫
Zn
∑
m∈M
∑
s∈S
ω(zn|m, s)PM (m)PS(s) · · ·
· · · log
∑u′∈M′ ω(zn|u′)1(fs(u′) = m)∑
u′′∈M′
ω(zn|u′′)PM (fs(u′′))
µ(dzn)
6
=
1
|S|
∫
Zn
∑
m∈M
∑
s∈S
ω(zn|m, s)PM (m) · · ·
· · · log
∑u′∈M′ ω(zn|u′)1(fs(u′) = m)∑
u′′∈M′
ω(zn|u′′)PM (fs(u′′))
µ(dzn).
Justification.
4) We will break with our convention slightly. Here we
have written ω(zn|u′) as shorthand for ωZn|M ′(zn|u′);
analogously for ω(zn|u′′). We will stick with this new
convention for the remainder of the proof; i.e. ω(·|u∗)
and ω(u∗) will be shorthand for densities with respect to
M ′.
5) By assumption, M⊥S.
6) By assumption, S ∼ unif(S).
At this point we can expand the conditional density
ω(zn|m, s) (from Equation (4)) and continue:
=
2−b
|S|
∫
Zn
∑
m∈M
s∈S
m′∈M′
ω(zn|m′)PM (m)1(fs(m′) = m) · · ·
· · · log
∑u′∈M′ ω(zn|u′)1(fs(u′) = m)∑
u′′∈M′
ω(zn|u′′)PM (fs(u′′))
µ(dzn) (6)
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7
=
2−b
|S|
∫
Zn
∑
m∈M
s∈S
m′∈M′
ω(zn|m′)PM (m)1(fs(m′) = m) · · ·
· · · log
∑u′∈M′ ω(zn|u′)1(fs(u′) = fs(m′))∑
u′′∈M′
ω(zn|u′′)PM (fs(u′′))
µ(dzn)
8
=
2−b
|S|
∫
Zn
∑
s∈S
m′∈M′
ω(zn|m′)PM (fs(m′)) · · ·
· · · log
∑u′∈M′ ω(zn|u′)1(fs(u′) = fs(m′))∑
u′′∈M′
ω(zn|u′′)PM (fs(u′′))
µ(dzn)
9
= 2−b
∫
Zn
[
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
m′∈M′
ω(zn|m′)PM (fs(m′)) · · ·
· · · log
( ∑
u′∈M′
ω(zn|u′)1(fs(u′) = fs(m′))
)]
+ · · ·
· · ·+
[
− 1|S|
∑
s′∈S
m′′∈M′
ω(zn|m′′)PM (fs′(m′′)) · · ·
· · · log
( ∑
u′′∈M′
ω(zn|u′′)PM (fs′(u′′))
)]
µ(dzn). (7)
Justification.
7) The entire summand is 0 unless m = fs(m
′), so we can
replace the m in the indicator function of the log as such
as long as we stick with the convention that 0 log 0 = 0
as the limit suggests.
8) As in Equation (5), the indicator will filter all but a single
m; namely, when m = fs(m
′).
9) We can break up the logarithm into a subtraction where
we change indices of the summation so as not to become
confused.
We will now consider each of expressions within the square
brackets of Equation (7) separately, starting with the first. The
first square bracket can be written (after multiplying by the
unit 2−k2k) as
2−k
∑
m′∈M′
ω(zn|m′)
[∑
s∈S
2k
|S|PM (fs(m
′)) · · ·
· · · log
( ∑
u′∈M′
ω(zn|u′)1(fs(u′) = fs(m′))
)]
. (8)
Our goal now will be to move the sum over s inside of the
logarithm via Jensen’s inequality. However, Jensen’s incurs
a multiplicative penalty if the weights do not sum to 1.
Fortunately, our weights do sum to 1 as shown next. Our
preprocessor is an SS-UHF and hence it is uniform. Thus for
any m′ ∈M′ we have:∑
s∈S
(
2k
|S|PM (fs(m
′))
)
=
∑
m∈M
PM (m)
2k
|S|
∑
s∈S
1 (fs(m
′) = m)
=1.
Thus we can aptly apply Jensen’s inequality (without carrying
around any extra factors) and move the preceding term inside
of the logarithm at the expense of an inequality. This yields:
(8) ≤ 2−k
∑
m′∈M′
ω(zn|m′) log
(
2k
∑
u′∈M′
ω(zn|u′) · · ·
· · ·
∑
s∈S
PM (fs(m
′))
|S| 1(fs(u
′) = fs(m
′))
)
.
(9)
If u′ = m′ in Equation (9), it is clear that the indicator will
always return 1 regardless of s ∈ S so that the argument of
the logarithm becomes∑
u′∈M′
ω(zn|u′)1(u′ = m′) = ω(zn|m′),
where we have again used the fact that our preprocessor is a
SS-UHF and is hence uniform.
On the contrary, if u′ 6= m′ in Equation (9), the indicator
will only return 1 some of the time, and a nice simplification
of the expression is not obvious at this time; we will address
this in a bit.
Combining these cases together, the entire first square
bracket of Equation (7) is less than or equal to:
2−k
∑
m′∈M′
ω(zn|m′) log
[
ω(zn|m′) + 2k
∑
u′∈M′
ω(zn|u′) · · ·
· · ·
∑
s∈S
PM (fs(m
′))
|S| 1(fs(u
′) = fs(m
′))1(u′ 6= m′)
]
.
Let us now move onto the second square bracket of Equa-
tion (7) above. We can write this term as
− 1|S|
∑
s′∈S
( ∑
m′′∈M′
ω(zn|m′′)PM (fs′(m′′))
)
· · ·
· · · log
( ∑
u′′∈M′
ω(zn|u′′)PM (fs′(u′′))
)
≤ − 1|S|
(∑
s′∈S
∑
m′′∈M′
ω(zn|m′′)PM (fs′(m′′))
)
· · ·
· · · log

∑
s′′∈S
∑
u′′∈M′
ω(zn|u′′)PM (fs′′(u′′))∑
s′′′∈S
1
 ,
where the inequality follows from the log-sum inequal-
ity. Now again using the fact that our preprocessor is
an SS-UHF and hence uniform we have the formula∑
s∈S
(
1
|S|PM (fs(m
′))
)
= 2−k for any m′ ∈ M′. Using
this, the entire second square bracket of Equation (7) becomes
less than or equal to
−2−k
∑
m′′∈M′
ω(zn|m′′) log
(
2−k
∑
u′′∈M′
ω(zn|u′′)
)
.
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We are now at a point where each square bracket of
Equation (7) is properly simplified. Thus:
(7) ≤ 2−b−k
∫
Zn
∑
m′∈M′
ω(zn|m′) log
(
2kω(zn|m′)∑
u′′∈M′
ω(zn|u′′) + · · ·
· · ·+ 2
k2k∑
u′′∈M′
ω(zn|u′′)
∑
u′∈M′
ω(zn|u′)
∑
s∈S
PM (fs(m
′))
|S| · · ·
· · ·1(fs(m′) = fs(u′))1(u′ 6= m′)
)
µ(dzn).
(10)
We will now simplify the inside of the logarithm. Consider
the first summand given by
2kω(zn|m′)∑
u′′∈M′
ω(zn|u′′) .
Conditional densities are defined as ω(zn|u′′) = ω(zn,u′′)ω(u′′) .
By Lemma B1, ω(u′′) = 2−l for every u′′ ∈ M′ so that
ω(zn|u′′) = 2lω(zn, u′′). Then by the marginal property
of densities,
∑
u′′∈M′ ω(z
n|u′′) = 2l∑u′′∈M′ ω(zn, u′′) =
2lω(zn). Moreover, using Bayes theorem and Lemma B1
again we can write
ω(zn|m′) = ω(m
′|zn)ω(zn)
ω(m′)
= 2lω(m′|zn)ω(zn). (11)
The term 2lω(zn) appears both in the numerator and denomi-
nator and thus cancels out. Hence the entire first summand of
the logarithm in Equation (10) becomes
2kω(m′|zn).
Now the second summand of the logarithm of Equation (10)
is given by
2k2k∑
u′′∈M′
ω(zn|u′′)
∑
u′∈M′
ω(zn|u′)
∑
s∈S
PM (fs(m
′))
|S| · · ·
· · ·1(fs(m′) = fs(u′))1(u′ 6= m′)
Using the same argument as in the preceding paragraph
we have
∑
u′′∈M′ ω(z
n|u′′) = 2lω(zn) and ω(zn|u′) =
2lω(zn)ω(u′|zn). Again, the term 2lω(zn) appears in both
the numerator and denominator thus canceling each other out.
Thus the second summand of the logarithm of Equation (10)
simplifies immediately to:
2k2k
∑
u′∈M′
ω(u′|zn)
∑
s∈S
PM (fs(m
′))
|S| · · ·
· · ·1(fs(m′) = fs(u′))1(u′ 6= m′).
= 2k2k
∑
u′∈M′
ω(u′|zn)1(u′ 6= m′)
∑
m∈M
PM (m) · · ·
· · · 1|S|
∑
s∈S
1(m = fs(m
′))1(fs(m
′) = fs(u
′)). (12)
Now note that∑
m∈M
∑
s∈S
PM (m)
1
|S|1(m = fs(m
′))1(fs(m
′) = fs(u
′))
= PMS [M = fS(m
′) and fS(m
′) = fS(u
′)]
= PMS [fS(m
′) = fS(u
′) |M = fS(m′)] · · ·
· · ·PMS [M = fS(m′)]
= PMS [M = fS(u
′)] · PMS [M = fS(m′)] . (13)
However,
PMS [M = fS(u
′)] =
∑
m∈M
∑
s∈S
PM (m)
1
|S|1 (m = fs(u
′))
=
∑
m∈M
PM (m)
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
1 (m = fs(u
′))
= 2−k
∑
m∈M
PM (m) (14)
= 2−k, (15)
where Equation (14) follows immediately from the uniform
property of our SS-UHF. From this we also have:
PMS [M = fS(m
′)] = 2−k.
Thus, combining Equation (13) and Equation (15) together
with Equation (12) simplifies the entire second summand of
the logarithm in Equation (10) to∑
u′∈M′
ω(u′|zn)1(u′ 6= m′) ≤
∑
u′∈M′
ω(u′|zn) = 1.
Then it follows, (continuing on from Equation (10)):
I(M ∧ Zn, S)
≤ 2−b−k
∫
Zn
∑
m′∈M′
ω(zn|m′) log (2kω(m′|zn) + 1)µ(dzn)
10
=
∫
Zn
ω(zn)
∑
m′∈M′
ω(m′|zn) log (2kω(m′|zn) + 1)µ(dzn)
11≤
∫
Zn
ω(zn) log
( ∑
m′∈M′
ω(m′|zn)(2kω(m′|zn) + 1)
)
µ(dzn)
=
∫
Zn
ω(zn) log
(
1 + 2k
∑
m′∈M′
ω(m′|zn)2
)
µ(dzn)
12≤ 2
1
2k
ln 2
∫
Zn
ω(zn)
( ∑
m′∈M′
ω(m′|zn)2
) 1
2
µ(dzn)
=
1
ln 2
2
1
2
(
k+2 log
∫
Zn
ω(zn)(
∑
m′∈M′ ω(m
′|zn)2)
1
2 µ(dzn)
)
=
1
ln 2
2
1
2 (k−H2(M
′|Zn))
=
1
ln 2
2
1
2 (k−l+l−H2(M
′|Zn))
13
=
1
ln 2
2
1
2 (−b+I2(M
′∧Zn))
14≤ 1
ln 2
2
1
2 (−b+Iα(M
′∧Zn)) for any α ∈ [2,∞].
Justification.
10) Equation (11) and b = l− k.
11) Jensen’s inequality on the sum over m′.
12) Use the bound log(1 + x) ≤ 1ln 2
√
x for all x ≥ 0.
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13) By Lemma B1, M ′ is uniform so that Hα(M
′) = l for
any α and Iα(M
′∧Zn) = Hα(M ′)−Hα(M ′|Zn). Also
recall b = l − k.
14) By Fact 2, I2(M
′ ∧ Zn) ≤ Iα(M ′ ∧ Zn) for any α ∈
[2,∞]. In particular, α =∞ here proves the second part
of our claim for the ǫ = 0 case.
With this, we have constructed an upper bound to I(M ∧
Zn, S) for an arbitrary message distribution PM . However,
since the bound did not depend on the specific choice of PM ,
the bound also holds for maxPM I(M ∧Zn, S). Therefore, we
have concluded the ǫ = 0 case.
Let us move onto the ǫ > 0 case. Fix some ǫ > 0 and
consider some (1− ǫ) typical set T ⊂M′ ×Zn.
Now consider Equation (6) in the previous string of inequal-
ities written as:
2−b
|S|
∫
Zn
∑
m∈M
s∈S
PM (m)
[ ∑
m′∈M′
ω(zn|m′)1(fs(m′) = m) · · ·
· · · log

∑
u′∈M′
ω(zn|u′)1(fs(u′) = m)∑
u′′∈M′
ω(zn|u′′)PM (fs(u′′))
µ(dzn).
(16)
Inside of the square bracket of Equation (16), zn and m can
be considered fixed, and thus, each of the 3 sums over M′
can be considered as a sum over two other sets:
M′1 = {m′ ∈ M′ : (m′, zn) ∈ T } and
M′2 = {m′ ∈ M′ : (m′, zn) ∈ T ∁},
where T ∁ denotes the complement of T in M′ ×Zn.
With this, we can then apply the log-sum inequality to
Equation (16) to yield the following:
(16) ≤ 2
−b
|S|
∫
Zn
∑
m∈M
s∈S
PM (m) · · ·
· · ·
 ∑
m′∈M′1
ω(zn|m′)1(fs(m′) = m)
 · · ·
· · · log

∑
u′∈M′1
ω(zn|u′)1(fs(u′) = m)∑
u′′∈M′1
ω(zn|u′′)PM (fs(u′′))
 + · · ·
· · ·+
 ∑
m′∈M′2
ω(zn|m′)1(fs(m′) = m)
 · · ·
· · · log

∑
u′∈M′2
ω(zn|u′)1(fs(u′) = m)∑
u′′∈M′2
ω(zn|u′′)PM (fs(u′′))

µ(dzn).
Now define QT by
2−b
|S|
∫
Zn
∑
m∈M
s∈S
PM (m)
∑
m′∈M′
ωT (z
n|m′)1(fs(m′) = m) · · ·
· · · log

∑
u′∈M′
ωT (z
n|u′)1(fs(u′) = m)∑
u′′∈M′
ωT (zn|u′′)PM (fs(u′′))
µ(dzn),
so that Equation (16) yields:
I(M ∧ Zn, S) ≤ QT +QT ∁ .
When considering just QT we can continue where we left
off from Equation (6) of the previous proof (ǫ = 0 case). In
fact, it is not hard to see that almost nothing changes and we
end up with
QT ≤ 1
ln 2
2
1
2 (−b+I
T
α (M
′∧Zn)),
for α ∈ [2,∞].
Now let’s focus on QT ∁ . It follows that:
QT ∁
15≤ 2
−b
|S|
∫
Zn
∑
s∈S
( ∑
m′∈M′
ωT ∁(z
n|m′)PM (fs(m′))
)
· · ·
· · · log
 ∑u′∈M′ ωT ∁(zn|u′)∑
u′′∈M′
ωT ∁(z
n|u′′)PM (fs(u′′))
µ(dzn)
16≤ 2
−b
|S|
∫
Zn
(∑
s∈S
∑
m′∈M′
ωT ∁(z
n|m′)PM (fs(m′))
)
· · ·
· · · log
 |S|∑u′∈M′ ωT ∁(zn|u′)∑
s′∈S
∑
u′′∈M′
ωT ∁(z
n|u′′)PM (fs′(u′′))
µ(dzn)
17
= 2−l
∫
Zn
∑
m′∈M′
ωT ∁(z
n|m′) · · ·
· · · log
2k∑u′∈M′ ωT ∁(zn|u′)∑
u′′∈M′
ωT ∁(z
n|u′′)
µ(dzn)
= k2−l
∑
m′∈M′
∫
Zn
ω(zn|m′)1
(
(m′, zn) ∈ T ∁
)
µ(dzn)
= k2−l
∑
m′∈M′
P
[
(M ′, Zn) ∈ T ∁ |M ′ = m′
]
18≤ kǫ.
Justification.
15) In the numerator of the logarithm, we have used the
trivial bound 1(fs(u
′) = m) ≤ 1 for all s, u′,m.
16) Log-sum inequality.
17) Our preprocessor is a SS-UHF and hence it is uniform.
18) We chose T to be a (1 − ǫ) typical set and there are 2l
pseudo-messages.
Again, just as in the ǫ = 0 case, we have provided an upper
bound to I(M ∧ Zn, S) for an arbitrary message distribution
PM so that the upper bound also holds for maxPM I(M ∧
Zn, S). This concludes the ǫ > 0 case.
Combining both cases, we have for any ǫ ≥ 0, α ∈ [2,∞]:
max
PM
I(M ∧ Zn, S) ≤ 1
ln 2
2
1
2 (−b+I
T
α (M
′∧Zn)) + ǫk.
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Since this inequality was derived using an arbitrary (1−ǫ)-
typical set T , we may as well optimize our choice of T while
keeping ǫ fixed so as to obtain the tightest possible bound.
With this we have proven the claim of Theorem 1. 
Proof of Theorem 2
1) Consider Corollary 1: we need the right hand side of
the inequality to approach 0 as n → ∞ to show our
wiretap coding scheme is semantically secure. We have as
n→∞ that Rn → Rs and RCn → RC . Since Rs is finite
then limn→∞ ǫnRn = 0 by the assumption that ǫn → 0
as n→∞. Now if limn→∞(RCn−Rn− I
ǫ
∞(X
n∧Zn)
n ) > 0
then the first term in the sum on the right hand side of
Corollary 1 will also go to 0. But this is equivalent to
Rs < RC − lim
n→∞
Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn)
n
.
If the right hand side is non-positive however, we will
instead choose Rs = 0 since rates must be non-negative.
2) Consider Corollary 1 again. Since
limn→∞
Iǫ
∞
(Xn∧Zn)
n ≤ ξ by assumption, we can
bound the asymptotic leakage as
lim
n→∞
max
PM
I(M ∧ Zn)
≤ lim
n→∞
(
1
ln 2
2−
n
2 (RCn−Rn)2
n
2
Iǫ
∞
(Xn∧Zn)
n + ǫnRn
)
=
1
ln 2
2
lim
n→∞
(−n2 (RCn−Rn))2
lim
n→∞
(n2 )· limn→∞
Iǫ
∞
(Xn∧Zn)
n +
· · ·+ lim
n→∞
ǫnRn
≤ 1
ln 2
2
lim
n→∞
(−n2 (RCn−Rn))2
lim
n→∞
(n2 )·ξ + lim
n→∞
ǫnRn
=
1
ln 2
2
lim
n→∞
(−n2 (RCn−Rn−ξ)) + lim
n→∞
ǫnRn.
At this point we can continue exactly as in part 1).
3) Clearly the first of the two summands on the right hand
side of the conclusion of Corollary 1 is exponentially
decreasing when Rs satisfies the rates given in either (1)
or (2) above. Thus, if ǫnRn is exponentially decreasing
with n, the semantic leakage is exponentially decreasing
to 0; i.e. W is exceptionally semantically secure. For
ǫnRn to be exponentially decreasing, it suffices for ǫ to
be exponentially decreasing.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2. 
APPENDIX C
REMOVING THE ASSUMPTION OF A PUBLIC SEED
In this appendix we shall overview a method that removes
the assumption of a public seed without rate/security/reliability
loss. This method is called seed recycling and can be found
in [5] and [8].
We have seen in Theorem 2 that our wiretap coding scheme
can provide semantic security for certain achievable rates
(provided that we prove a bound on the max-information
rate), however, we have assumed hitherto that the seed S was
publicly available to all parties. This is in strict violation of
assumptions on a wiretap channel; that is, all communication
must take place over the wiretap channel. In this section, we
remove this assumption and transmit the seed over the wiretap
channel. We will show asymptotically that no rate, security,
or reliability is lost.
As a first attempt to resolve this violation, suppose the
seed is transmitted before beginning transmission of an ac-
tual message. This is a problem, however, because it leads
to information rate loss as follows. Suppose the seed can
be transmitted with a probability of error less than some
pe,n to the intended receiver in nc channel uses for some
constant c > 1. Then the transmitter sends k message bits
of information in another n channel uses. Overall, k bits of
information were transferred in n + nc = n(1 + c) channel
uses, thus our overall secure information rate in this case is
given asymptotically by
lim
n→∞
k
n(1 + c)
=
1
1 + c
Rs < Rs ,
where Rs is the previous secure achievable rate assuming
the seed was public. In other words, the possible asymptotic
rates now achievable when sending the seed before message
transmission are strictly less than before. Therefore, in this
case, the rates achieved using Theorem 2 are no longer
possible.
As a better attempt to resolve this problem, suppose we use
the same seed to send η messages M1,M2, . . . ,Mη using η
independent instances of the wiretap channel. First we will
pick a block-length n and on the first instance of the wiretap
channel, we will send the seed over in nc channel uses, where
c > 1 is chosen so that the seed’s probability of error at the
intended receiver is less than or equal to pe,n. Pessimistically
(from the point of view at the transmitter), we will assume
that the eavesdropper always receives a perfect copy of the
seed. Now on each of the η independent channel instances,
we will send a corresponding message using the same scheme
as outlined in section III except using the same seed for each
instance. Let M = (M1,M2, . . . ,Mη) be the vector consisting
of the η messages and let Z = (Zn(1), Zn(2), . . . , Zn(η))
where Zn(i) is the n-letter eavesdropper output corresponding
to the i-th message (also to the i-th channel instance).
Consider first the rate of this new procedure. In each of the η
channel uses, we are sending k bits of information. Moreover,
we will end up using the channel η ·n times for the messages
and nc times for the seed. Overall, the asymptotic secure rate
of this new procedure is thus given by
lim
n→∞
ηk
ηn+ cn
= lim
n→∞
k
n(1 + c/η)
=
Rs
limn→∞(1 + c/η)
,
where Rs is again the previous asymptotic secure achievable
rate when the seed was public. Since c is a constant, the only
way to avoid information rate loss asymptotically is if η →∞
as n→∞.
Consider next the reliability of this new procedure. If each
message has probability of error at the intended receiver
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bounded by pe,n, then the probability that M is in error is
given in the next lemma.
Lemma C1 (Reliability). The probability that M is in error
is upper bounded by
1− (1− pe,n)η.
Proof. Let Ai be the event corresponding to the i-th message
being in error. Then A =
⋃η
i=1Ai is the event corresponding
to at least one of the η messages being in error. Hence P(A)
is the probability of error of M.
Then since each instance of the wiretap channel is indepen-
dent, we have the following.
P(A) = 1− P(A∁)
= 1− P
(
η⋂
i=1
A∁i
)
= 1−
η∏
i=1
P(A∁i )
= 1−
η∏
i=1
(1− P(Ai))
≤ 1−
η∏
i=1
(1− pe,n)
= 1− (1− pe,n)η.
This concludes the proof of Lemma C1. 
With this lemma, we see that in order to transmit reliably,
we have another constraint on η, that is, we must choose η so
that (1− pe,n)η → 1 as n→∞.
Consider last the leakage of this new procedure.
Lemma C2 (Security). For some i ∈ {1, . . . , η} the following
holds:
max
PM
I(M ∧ Z) ≤ η ·max
PM
I(Mi ∧ Zn(i)|S).
Proof. Let M have an arbitrary distribution PM. By the chain
rule of mutual information,
I(M ∧ Z) ≤ I(M ∧ Z, S).
Since S⊥Mi for each i, then S⊥M. Then by the chain rule
of mutual information again, we have,
I(M ∧ Z) ≤ I(M ∧ Z|S).
Now (M1, Z
n(1)), . . . , (Mη, Z
n(η)) are mutually indepen-
dent once we are given S, thus by a standard mutual informa-
tion inequality we have
I(M ∧ Z) ≤
η∑
i=1
I(Mi ∧ Zn(i)|S).
We want to maximize I(M ∧ Z) over all probability distri-
butions PM. However, that is equivalent to maximizing over
each choice of PMi individually. The above becomes:
max
PM
I(M ∧ Z) ≤
η∑
i=1
max
PMi
I(Mi ∧ Zn(i)|S).
Here i represents an instance of the wiretap channel. Choose
the channel instance j that corresponds to the most leakage
maxPMj I(Mj ∧ Zn(j)|S) leaked to the eavesdropper. The
above then becomes
max
PM
I(M ∧ Z) ≤ ηmax
PMj
I(Mj ∧ Zn(j)|S).
This concludes the proof of Lemma C2. 
This lemma intuitively says that the message leakage of all
η wiretap channel instances is no more than the number of
channel instances multiplied by the leakage over the “worst
case” wiretap channel (worst here is with respect to the trans-
mitter). Combining this result with Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
gives the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Let i be the wiretap channel instance where
the transmitter leaks the most information to the eavesdropper.
Let RCn be the rate of the ECC and Rn the secure rate of
transmission for that wiretap channel instance. It follows that
max
PM
I(M ∧ Z) ≤ η
ln 2
2−
n
2 (RCn−Rn−
1
n I
ǫ
∞(X
n∧Zn)) + ǫηnRn.
With this, just as in Theorem 2, we see that if Rn < RCn−
1
nI
ǫ
∞(X
n ∧ Zn) for each n, then so long as η grows with n
strictly slower than exponential, the first term will go to 0.
Furthermore, η must be chosen slow enough so that ǫηn→ 0
as n→∞.
In summary, with regards to how η must grow with n we
need the following as n→∞:
• η →∞ to guarantee negligible rate loss,
• (1− pe,n)η → 1 to guarantee negligible reliability loss,
• η must grow slower than exponential in n and ǫηn→ 0
to guarantee negligible security loss.
It will depend on the specific choice of ǫ and pe,n in each
case in order to properly determine η, however, if for example
ǫ is exponentially diminishing with n and pe,n diminishes on
the order of 1/n, then picking η on the order of log(n) will be
sufficient to satisfy all of the previous requirements. Indeed,
there is significant flexibility in these three parameters and
finding them to satisfy the previous requirements should not
be too intrusive.
Intuitively, the previous has a nice interpretation. It says
that as long as we keep on adding new independent messages
when increasing the block length, we can still achieve the same
rate, reliability, and security asymptotically as before when we
assumed the seed to be public.
APPENDIX D
PROOFS FROM SECTION V
In this appendix we will prove two statements from the
first applications section. We first prove Lemma 2, which
simplifies the expression of max information. Then we provide
a reworked proof of [8, Lemma 6] (Lemma D1) as an aid for
our proof of Theorem 5 in Appendix G.
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Proof of Lemma 2
Recall that Xn = en(M
′) is a random variable over Cn with
the same distribution as M ′. By Lemma B1, this means Xn is
uniform over Cn. Since Cn has 2
l elements then ω(xn) = 2−l.
Now consider the following string of equalities.
IT∞(X
n ∧ Zn)
= log |Cn| −HT∞(Xn|Zn)
= l + log
∫
Zn
ω(zn) max
xn∈Cn
ωT (x
n|zn)µ(dzn)
= log
∫
Zn
max
xn∈Cn
ω(xn, zn)
2−l
1 ((xn, zn) ∈ T )µ(dzn)
= log
∫
Zn
max
xn∈Cn
ωT (z
n|xn)µ(dzn).
This proves the validity of Lemma 2. 
Lemma D1 ([8, Lemma 6]). Let δ > 0 small. Then for any
(1− ǫ) typical set T where ǫ = exp(−nδn/8), the asymptotic
ǫ-smooth average max-information of an AWGN eavesdropper
channel E is bounded by the point-to-point capacity:
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
ωT (z
n|xn)dzn ≤ CE .
Proof. Define a set
Pout = {zn ∈ Rn | ||zn||2 ≤ n(P + σ2E)(1 + δ)}.
Also for each xn ∈ Cn define a set
Pxnnoise = {zn | ||zn − xn||2 ≥ nσ2E(1− δ)}.
Now let Tout, Tnoise ⊂ Cn×Rn be sets defined as Tout = Cn×
Pout and Tnoise = {(xn, zn) | zn ∈ Pxnnoise for each xn ∈ Cn}.
Then define a set T = Tout ∩ Tnoise.
It was shown in [8] that T is a (1− ǫ)-typical set using the
given ǫ. Note that ǫ→ 0 exponentially fast with n. With this
we have the following.∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
ω(zn|xn)1((xn, zn) ∈ T )dzn
1
=
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
[(
n∏
i=1
1√
2πσ2E
exp
(
− (zi − xi)
2
2σ2E
))
· · ·
· · ·1((xn, zn) ∈ T )
]
dzn
=
1
(2πσ2E)
n
2
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
[
exp
(
−‖z
n − xn‖2
2σ2E
)
· · ·
· · ·1((xn, zn) ∈ T )
]
dzn
2≤ exp
(−n2 (1− δ))
(2πσ2E)
n
2
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
1((xn, zn) ∈ T )dzn
3≤ exp
(−n2 (1− δ))
(2πσ2E)
n
2
∫
Pout
dzn
4
=
exp
(−n2 (1 − δ))
(2πσ2E)
n
2
Vol(Pout)
5
=
exp
(−n2 (1 − δ))
(2πσ2E)
n
2
(πn(P + σ2E)(1 + δ))
n
2
Γ(n/2 + 1)
.
Justification.
1) On an AWGN channel, given that xi was sent, we know
that each output is a normal random variable with
mean xi and variance σ
2
E . Since we assume the channel
is memoryless, we can split this density simply into a
product.
2) We are working on T in the integral and thus Pnoise. Thus,
‖zn − xn‖2 ≥ nσ2E(1− δ).
3) The indicator function returns either 0 or 1 in the area
of interest Pout ∩ Pnoise and 0 elsewhere. Thus, we can
simply upper bound the indicator by 1 everywhere inside
of Pout.
4) Consider the following equalities:∫
Pout
dzn =
∫
Rn
1(zn ∈ Pout)dzn = µ(Pout) = Vol(Pout).
5) Pout is clearly a ball in real n space of radius n(P +
σ2E)(1+ δ). The volume of an n ball of radius r is given
by
πn/2
Γ(n/2 + 1)
rn,
where here Γ is the gamma function (generalized facto-
rial) from analysis.
Taking the logarithm of both sides of the preceding and
dividing by n yields:
1
n
log
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
ωT (z
n|xn)dzn
≤ 1
n
log
(
exp (−(1− δ))
2
(n(1 + P/σ2E)(1 + δ))
Γ(n/2 + 1)2/n
)n/2
=
1
2
(
log
(
1 +
P
σ2E
)
+ log
(
(1 + δ)eδ
)
+ · · ·
· · ·+ log
(
1
2e
· n
Γ(n/2 + 1)2/n
))
= CE +
1
2
log
(
(1 + δ)eδ
)
+
1
2
log
(
1
2e
· n
Γ(n/2 + 1)2/n
)
.
Fortunately, n
Γ(n/2+1)2/n
→ 2e as n → ∞. Moreover, our
choice of δ is not restricted and can be made arbitrarily small.
This completes the proof of Lemma D1. 
APPENDIX E
SPHERE PACKING ARGUMENT FOR NO-CSIT CHANNELS
In this appendix we provide motivation for how we con-
structed the typical set in the No-CSIT scenario. We provide
sphere packing bounds in this case that are analogous to their
AWGN counterparts (cf. [29], [34]).
The capacity expression for an additive white Gaussian
noise channel (AWGN) is motivated by an intuitive argument
called sphere packing. The argument asserts that due to
27
properties of Gaussian random variables, a received output
vector should be contained in some small n-dimensional ball
around the transmitted codeword with high probability. In
other words, the noise of the channel will only disturb the
input vector by a certain amount (the radius of the small
ball) with high probability. Furthermore, all received outputs
should be contained in some larger ball with high probability
since we are assuming that all the codewords are being
transmitted while obeying the power constraint. If we use
maximum likelihood decoding, given an output that resides in
one of the small balls, the receiver assumes it came from the
codeword that generated said ball. Therefore, the maximum
number of small spheres we can pack into the larger ball
roughly corresponds to how many codewords we can transmit
reliably. This technique is called sphere packing since we are
attempting to pack the larger ball with smaller spheres. Exact
calculation is quite challenging; however, simply dividing the
volume of the large ball by the volume in a small sphere
gives an upper bound. What is perhaps surprising is that as the
block length approaches infinity, this upper bound is actually
achievable and is exactly the capacity of the AWGN channel.
We will provide a symmetric argument for the fast fading
channel as justification for how and why we choose our typical
sets the way we do in the No-CSIT case. Given an input xn
and channel coefficient hn, we know the output zn will reside
in some small ball about the point hnxn with high probability
since we assume the noise follows a Gaussian distribution. In
fact, such a ball will have radius
√
nσ2E(1 + δ) for δ > 0
small.
In the case of the AWGN channel, the larger ball’s dimen-
sions were derived using the fact that we expect our channel to
obey the law of conservation of energy; that is, the maximum
output energy should be equal to the summation of the
maximum input energy and noise energy. We expect a similar
phenomenon to hold on the fast fading channel; however,
the input energy will also depend on the channel coefficient
realization. During the ith symbol transmission, suppose hi is
the realized channel coefficient; then the effective maximum
input power is given by h2iP so that the effective maximum
average output power 1nZ
2
i is given by h
2
iP+σ
2
E . Therefore we
expect the realization z2i to be less than n(h
2
iP +σ
2
E)(1+ δ).
Since i is a coordinate of the vector zn, we should then
expect zn to be found in some volume where each com-
ponent zi is bounded by ±
√
n(h2iP + σ
2
E)(1 + δ). Because
hi is changing for each use of the channel, each of these
bounds will be different. Therefore, in contrast to the AWGN
channel where each upper bound was constant with respect
to each component, the volume in this case is actually an
n-dimensional ellipsoid with radii
√
n(h2iP + σ
2
E)(1 + δ).
Thus, if we try to pack as many spheres into this ellipsoid
as possible as illustrated in the (2-dimensional) Figure 4, we
should come up with the maximum number of codewords we
can transmit reliably, i.e., an expression for capacity.
Using the same technique as [29], we simply divide the
volume of the ellipsoid by the volume of the small balls. That
is, since the volume of an ellipsoid with radii ri is given by
c·∏ni=1 ri where c is the same constant factor used to calculate
the volume of an n-dimensional ball, it follows that an upper
bound to the max number of codewords is given by:
c ·
n∏
i=1
√
n(h2iP + σ
2
E)(1 + δ)
c ·√nσ2E(1 + δ)n
=
n∏
i=1
√
nσ2E(1 + h
2
iSNR)(1 + δ)√
nσ2E(1 + δ)
n
=
n∏
i=1
√
1 + h2iSNR.
Since rate is usually defined as the logarithm of the number
of codewords normalized by n, an upper bound to the max
achievable rate is given by:
1
n
log
n∏
i=1
√
1 + h2iSNR =
1
2
(
1
n
log
n∏
i=1
(1 + h2iSNR)
)
=
1
2
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
log(1 + h2iSNR)
)
n→∞−−−−→ 1
2
E
[
log(1 +H2ESNR)
]
= CE ,
where the convergence follows from the law of large numbers.
Since the above characterizations correctly estimated the
asymptotic upper bound for the fast fading channel using the
same sphere packing argument as in the AWGN case, we are
confident moving forward that these bounds will produce sets
that are typical in the proper sense.
√
n(h21P + σ
2
E)(1 + δ)
√
n(h22P + σ
2
E)(1 + δ) √
nσ2E(1 + δ)
Fig. 4. Sphere packing for the fading channel.
APPENDIX F
FADING: PROOF OF LEMMA 5, FACT 7, AND LEMMA 6
In this appendix we prove results related to fading. In partic-
ular we prove Lemma 5 (a simplification of max information
on fast fading channels), Fact 7 (the usual result converting
complex fast fading channels into real parallel fading channels
when CSIR is available), and Lemma 6 (further simplification
of max-information in the No-CSIT case).
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Proof of Lemma 5
The proof follows directly.
2I
T
∞
(Xn∧Zn,Λn)
= |Cn|
∫
Zn×Hn
ω(zn, λn) max
xn∈Cn
ωT (x
n|zn, λn)µ(dzn, dλn)
1
=
∫
Hn
∫
Zn
max
xn∈Cn
ωT (z
n, xn, λn)
ω(xn)
µ(dzn)µ(dλn)
2
= EΛn
∫
Zn
max
xn∈Cn
ωT (z
n, xn,Λn)
ω(xn)ω(Λn)
µ(dzn)
3
= EΛn
∫
Zn
max
xn∈Cn
ωT (z
n|xn, λn)µ(dzn).
Justification.
1) First recall that |Cn| = 2l. Next, Xn = en(M ′) has
the same distribution as M ′; that is, ω(xn) = 2−l by
Lemma B1. Thus, we can move the 2l inside of the
maximization then convert to ω(xn). Moreover, we can
move ω(zn, λn) inside of the maximization since it does
not depend on the maximizing variable xn. Lastly note
that each µ here is not equivalent to each other or the
measure from the previous line, it is denoted such simply
for notational convenience.
2) We can multiply by the unit ω(λn)/ω(λn) inside of the
maximization. Then we can pull out ω(λn) since it does
not depend on the maximizing variable xn.
3) Here we are using the assumption that Xn⊥Λn so that
ω(xn)ω(λn) = ω(xn, λn). Then we use the definition of a
conditional probability density function.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 5. 
Proof of Fact 7.
Without loss of generality, consider the intended receiver’s
channel given above and drop the index i for simplicity.
Therefore, we are working with the complex fading channel
Y = HTX+UT . Since HT ∈ C we can write HT = |HT |eiθ
and thus, the receiver will receive the random variable Y =
|HT |eiθX + UT . However, since we are assuming channel
state information is available at the receiver, the receiver
actually knows the realization of HT and hence knows the
value eiθ . The receiver thus adjusts his output Y accordingly:
Y e−iθ = |HT |X+UT e−iθ . Also, the additive white Gaussian
noise is assumed to be circularly symmetric, so that UT e
−iθ
is actually distributed the same way as was UT . Therefore, if
we define Y˜ = Y e−iθ as the new output and U˜T = UT e
−iθ
as the rotated noise, under the assumption of CSIR, the
receiver can convert the original channel into the new channel:
Y˜ = |HT |X+ U˜T . Now we can break up this channel into its
real and imaginary parts:
Y˜R + iY˜I = (|HT |XR + i|HT |XI) +
(
(U˜T )R + i(U˜T )I
)
.
Combining the real and imaginary parts respectively yields
two parallel channels
Y˜R = |HT |XR + (U˜T )R
Y˜I = |HT |XI + (U˜T )I .
Here each output is identically given as
Y ′ = |HT |X ′ + U ′T
where |HT | ∈ R+, X ′ ∈ R, U ′T ∼ N (0, σ2T ), and E
[
(X ′)2
] ≤
P . This concludes the proof of Fact 7. 
Proof of Lemma 6.
From Lemma 5 and recalling that Λn = (HnT , H
n
E), we have:
2I
T
∞(X
n∧Zn,HnT ,H
n
E)
= EHnTHnE
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
ωT (z
n|xn, HnT , HnE)dzn
1
=
∫
Rn+
ω(hnE)
∫
Rn+
ω(hnT )
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
ωT (z
n|xn, hnE)dzndhnTdhnE
=
∫
Rn+
ω(hnE)
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
ωT (z
n|xn, hnE)dzndhnE
= EHnE
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
ωT (z
n|xn, HnE)dzn.
Justification.
1) Independence of HnE and H
n
T . Also, Zi = HE,iXi+UE,i
and Xi is not a function of the channel coefficients since
we have No-CSIT; therefore, Zn is independent of HnT .
This concludes the proof of Lemma 6. 
APPENDIX G
NO-CSIT: PROOF OF LEMMA 7, LEMMA 8, AND
THEOREM 5
In this appendix we prove the main results related to the
No-CSIT fast fading wiretap channel. In particular, we prove
Lemma 7, Lemma 8 (proves that the sets we defined for No-
CSIT are actually typical), and Theorem 5 (one of our main
results that proves a bound on max-information in the No-
CSIT scenario).
Proof of Lemma 7
To prove Lemma 7, we will first need a fact and a lemma.
The fact is due to [37] where we have modified its form
so as to be easily utilized in the following proofs. It can be
considered a generalization of Hoeffding’s inequality [38] to
the case of unbounded random variables.
Fact 12. [37, Theorem 2.1] Let {Wi}ni=1 be a sequence of
independent random variables. Suppose for all i there exists
a γi > 0 such that E
[
eγi|Wi|
]
<∞. Then for any sufficiently
small a > 0,
P
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
(Wi − E[Wi])
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ a
]
≥ 1− 2e− na
2
4K∗
where Ki = 2(E
[
W 4i
]
)
1
2E
[
ea|Wi|
]
and K∗ = max
i
Ki.
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The second item that will be needed for the proof of
Lemma 7 is the following.
Lemma G1. The following inequality holds:
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
Z2i
σ2E +H
2
E,iP
∣∣∣∣Xn = xn
]
≤ 1.
Proof.
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
Z2i
σ2E +H
2
E,iP
∣∣∣∣Xn = xn
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
H2E,ix
2
i + U
2
E,i + 2HE,ixiUE,i
σ2E +H
2
E,iP
]
1
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
x2i · E
[
H2E,i
σ2E +H
2
E,iP
]
+ · · ·
· · ·+ EU2E,i · E
[
1
σ2E +H
2
E,iP
]
+ EUE,i · E
[
2x2iHE,i
σ2E +H
2
E,iP
]
2
=
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
x2i
)
· E
[
H2E
σ2E +H
2
EP
]
+ E
[
σ2E
σ2E +H
2
EP
]
3≤ E
[
H2EP
σ2E +H
2
EP
]
+ E
[
σ2E
σ2E +H
2
EP
]
= 1.
Justification.
1) Follows from independence of HE , UE .
2) UE is i.i.d. and ∼ N (0, σ2E).
3) Follows from the power constraint on all codewords.
This completes the proof of Lemma G1. 
With these tools in hand, we now give the proof of
Lemma 7.
1) Proof of Lemma 7.1.
Let13 µˆ = E
[
1
n
∑n
i=1
Z2i
σ2E+H
2
E,iP
∣∣∣∣Xn = xn]. Then,
P
[
(HnE , Z
n) ∈ P1n
∣∣∣∣Xn = xn]
= P
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
Z2i
σ2E +H
2
E,iP
− 1 ≤ δn
∣∣∣∣Xn = xn
]
≥ P
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
Z2i
σ2E +H
2
E,iP
− µˆ ≤ δn
∣∣∣∣Xn = xn
]
= P
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
x2iH
2
E,i + U
2
E,i + 2xiHE,iUE,i
σ2E +H
2
E,iP
− µˆ ≤ δn
]
,
(17)
where the inequality follows from Lemma G1.
Since xn is a constant and {HE,i} and {UE,i} are each
mutually independent, the term
x2iH
2
E,i + U
2
E,i + 2xiHE,iUE,i
σ2E +H
2
E,iP
13Note that µˆ is the mean here, i.e. it is a number, and is not related to the
measure µ.
is an independent random variable. Let us show that it
also satisfies the main condition of Fact 12 (dropping the
subscript E on HE,i and UE,i to reduce clutter).
E exp
(
γ
x2iH
2
i + U
2
i + 2xiHiUi
σ2 +H2i P
)
= E exp
(
γ
x2iH
2
i + U
2
i + 2xiHiUi
σ2 +H2i P
)
1 (Hi > 1)+
· · ·+ E exp
(
γ
x2iH
2
i + U
2
i + 2xiHiUi
σ2 +H2i P
)
1 (Hi ≤ 1)
1≤ E exp
(
γ
(
x2iH
2
i
H2i P
+
U2i
σ2
+
2xiH
2
i Ui
H2i P
))
1 (Hi > 1)+
· · ·+ E exp
(
γ
(
x2iH
2
i
H2i P
+
U2i
σ2
+
2xiUi
σ2
))
1 (Hi ≤ 1)
= E exp
(
γ
(
x2i
P
+
U2i
σ2
+
2xiUi
P
))
+ E exp
(
γ
(
x2i
P
+
U2i
σ2
+
2xiUi
σ2
))
≤ E exp
(
2γ
(
Ui
σ
+ xi
P + σ2
2Pσ
)2)
2≤ E exp
(
2γ (Gi)
2
)
3
<∞.
Justification.
1) Hi > 1 implies Hi ≤ H2i .
2) Gi ∼ N (xi P+σ22Pσ , 1) implies that G2i is a non-central
χ2 random variable.
3) Choosing γ appropriately ensures the moment gener-
ating function is finite.
Since a finite moment generating function implies every
moment is finite, Ki exists for all i so that K
∗ is well
defined. Therefore, using Fact 12, it follows immediately
that
(17) ≥ 1− 2e− nδ
2
n
4K∗ ,
thereby completing the proof of Lemma 8.1. 
2) Proof of Lemma 7.2.
P
[
Zn ∈ P2n
∣∣∣∣Xn = xn, HnE = hn]
= P
[
‖Zn − xnhn‖2 ≥ nσ2E(1 − δ′n)∣∣∣∣Xn = xn, HnE = hn]
= P
[
n∑
i=1
(Zi − xihi)2 ≥ nσ2E(1− δ′n)∣∣∣∣Xn = xn, HnE = hn]
= P
[
n∑
i=1
(Ui + xihi − xihi)2 ≥ nσ2E(1− δ′n)
]
30
= P
[
1
σ2E
n∑
i=1
U2i ≥ n(1− δ′n)
]
1≥ 1− e−nδ
′
n
2
4 .
Justification.
1) Chi-squared tail bounds [39, Lemma 1].

3) Proof of Lemma 7.3.
To prove this, we will use Fact 12 reduced to the i.i.d.
case. We have that {log(1+H2E,iSNR)} is a sequence of
i.i.d. random variables; to employ Fact 12 it remains to
prove that E
[
eγ| log(1+H
2
ESNR)|
]
<∞ for some γ > 0.
E
[
eγ| log(1+H
2
ESNR)|
]
= E
[
eγ
ln(1+H2ESNR)
ln(2)
]
= E
[
(1 +H2ESNR)
γ
ln(2)
]
Letting γ = ln 2:
= E
[
(1 +H2ESNR)
]
= 1 + E[H2E ]SNR
<∞.
Then Fact 12 gives us:
P
[
HnE ∈ P3n
]
= P
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
log
(
1 +H2E,iSNR
) · · ·
· · · − E [1 +H2ESNR]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ′′n
]
≥ 1− 2e−nδ
′′
n
2
4K ,
where
K = 2
(
E
[
log(1 +H2ESNR)
4
]) 1
2
E
[
eγ log(1+H
2
ESNR)
]
.

At this point we have finished the proof of Lemma 7.
Proof of Lemma 8.
P
[
(HnT , X
n, HnE , Z
n) ∈ Rn+ × Tn|Xn = xn
]
1≥ P [(HnT ) ∈ Rn+|Xn = xn]+ · · ·
· · ·+ P [(Xn, HnE , Zn) ∈ Tn|Xn = xn]− 1
= P [(Xn, HnE , Z
n) ∈ Tn|Xn = xn]
= P
[
(Xn, HnE , Z
n) ∈ T 1n ∩ T 2n ∩ T 3n |Xn = xn
]
2≥ P [(Xn, HnE , Zn) ∈ T 1n |Xn = xn]+ · · ·
· · ·+ P [(Xn, HnE , Zn) ∈ T 2n |Xn = xn]+ · · ·
· · ·+ P [(Xn, HnE , Zn) ∈ T 3n |Xn = xn]− 2
3
= P
[
(HnE , Z
n) ∈ P1n
∣∣∣∣Xn = xn]+ · · ·
· · ·+ EHnE
(
P
[
Zn ∈ P2n
∣∣∣∣HnE = hn, Xn = xn])+ · · ·
· · ·+ P [HnE ∈ P3n]− 2
4≥ (1− ǫ1n) + (1− ǫ2n) + (1− ǫ3n)− 2
= 1− (ǫ1n + ǫ2n + ǫ3n)
= 1− ǫn.
Justification.
1) Fre´chet inequality for Cartesian products.
2) Fre´chet inequality for intersections.
3) The second term of the sum is explained here:
P
[
(Xn, HnE , Z
n) ∈ T 2n |Xn = xn
]
=
∫
Hn
∫
Zn
ω(zn, hnE |xn)1((xn, hnE , zn) ∈ T 2n )dzndhnE
=
∫
Hn
∫
Zn
ωT 2n (z
n|hnE , xn)ω(hnE , xn)
ω(xn)
dzndhnE
=
∫
Hn
ω(hnE)
∫
Zn
ωT 2n (z
n|hnE , xn)dzndhnE
= EHnE
(
P
[
Zn ∈ P2n
∣∣∣∣HnE = hn, Xn = xn]) .
4) This line follows immediately from Lemma 7.
This completes the proof of Lemma 8. 
Proof of Theorem 5
The proof of Theorem 5 follows directly and is analogous to
our proof of Lemma D1 found in Appendix D.
2I
ǫ
∞(X
n∧Zn,HnT ,H
n
E)
1≤ 2ITn∞ (Xn∧Zn,HnT ,HnE)
2
= EHnE
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
ωTn(z
n|xn, HnE)dzn
3
= EHnE
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
[(
n∏
i=1
1√
2πσ2E
e
− 1
2σ2
E
(zi−HE,ixi)
2
)
· · ·
· · · 1((xn, HnE , zn) ∈ Tn)
]
dzn
=
1
(2πσ2E)
n
2
EHn
E
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
(
e
− 1
2σ2
E
‖zn−HnEx
n‖2 · · ·
· · · 1((xn, HnE , zn) ∈ Tn)
)
dzn
4≤ e
−n2 (1−δ
′
n)
(2πσ2E)
n
2
EHnE
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
1((xn, HnE , z
n) ∈ Tn)dzn
5
=
e−
n
2 (1−δ
′
n)
(2πσ2E)
n
2
EHnE
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
1((xn, HnE , z
n) ∈ T 1n ∩ T 2n ) · · ·
· · ·1((xn, HnE , zn) ∈ T 3n )dzn
=
e−
n
2 (1−δ
′
n)
(2πσ2E)
n
2
EHnE

1(HnE ∈ P3n) · · ·
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· · ·
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
1((xn, HnE , z
n) ∈ T 1n ∩ T 2n )dzn
 .
(18)
Justification.
1) Rn+×Tn is a (1− ǫn) typical set; however, it may not be
the set corresponding to the “smallest” ǫn smooth max-
information. Note that here we are labeling our typical
set as just Tn for ease and dropping the subscript on ǫn.
2) Lemma 6. Since we no longer have any dependencies on
HT , we will henceforth write our typical set as just Tn.
3) Each output, given Xi = xi and HE,i = hE,i, is Zi =
hE,ixi + UE,i. This is simply a normal random variable
that is shifted in mean by hE,ixi with variance σ
2
E . Thus,
the density for each transmission is given as
ω(zi|xi, hE,i) = 1√
2πσ2E
e
− 1
2σ2
E
(zi−hE,ixi)
2
.
Since we assume the channel is memoryless, we can split
this density simply into a product.
4) We are working on Tn and thus P2n; thus,
‖zn − hnExn‖2 ≥ nσ2E(1− δ′n).
5) T 1n , T 2n , T 3n are defined in Section VI-B.
Let us gain some intuition of what is happening at this point.
In Equation (18), suppose T ⋆n = T 1n ∩T 2n and let us understand
the term
max
xn∈Cn
1((xn, hnE , z
n) ∈ T ⋆n ).
If we temporarily fix zn and hnE , then this maximization is
simply asking if there exists some codeword xn ∈ Cn that
makes the sequence (xn, hnE , z
n) an element of the set T ⋆n .
If there does exist such an xn then this function returns 1;
otherwise, it returns 0. If we now relax zn and only fix hnE ,
T ⋆n can be thought of as a typical set as well: it is the set
of typical input-output pairs. Thus the above function takes
some output zn and asks if there is possibly any codewords
that could have generated such an output knowing the channel
coefficient is hnE . It follows then, that the integral∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
1((xn, hnE , z
n) ∈ T ⋆n )dzn,
roughly “counts” the number of valid input-output pairs given
some hnE .
To calculate such an integral, we need to know the shape
of T ⋆n and it is clear that T ⋆n = T 1n ∩T 2n ⊂ T 1n so that we can
replace the T ⋆n with a T 1n in the above integral at the expense
of an inequality. However, this has removed the maximization
since T 1n has no dependence on codewords. Therefore the
above integration is less than or equal to∫
Rn
1((hnE , z
n) ∈ P1n)dzn.
Given some hnE , by definition this integral is equal to
the Lebesgue measure of P1n which is precisely the vol-
ume of P1n. Since P1n is actually an ellipsoid with radii,
√
nσ2E(1 + h
2
E,iSNR)(1 + δn), then this integration is actu-
ally calculating the volume of said ellipsoid, which is calcu-
lated to be
π
n
2
Γ(n2 + 1)
n∏
i=1
√
nσ2E(1 + h
2
E,iSNR)(1 + δn),
where Γ is the usual gamma function of analysis.
Let us return to Equation (18); using the aforementioned
reasoning above we have:
(18) ≤ e
−n2 (1−δ
′
n)
(2πσ2E)
n
2
EHnE
[(
π
n
2
Γ(n2 + 1)
1(HnE ∈ P3n) · · ·
· · ·
n∏
i=1
√
nσ2e(1 +H
2
E,iSNR)(1 + δn)
)]
=
e−
n
2 (1−δ
′
n)
(2πσ2E)
n
2
π
n
2
Γ(n2 + 1)
(nσ2E(1 + δn))
n
2 · · ·
· · ·EHn
E
[(
1(HnE ∈ P3n)
n∏
i=1
√
(1 +H2E,iSNR)
)]
=
(
(1 + δn)e
δ′n
n
2e · Γ(n2 + 1)
2
n
)n
2
· · ·
· · ·
∫
P3n
ω(hnE)
n∏
i=1
√
(1 + h2E,iSNR)dh
n
E
6≤
(
(1 + δn)e
δ′n
n
2e · Γ(n2 + 1)
2
n
)n
2
· · ·
· · ·
∫
P3n
ω(hnE)2
n
2 (δ
′′
n+EHE [1+H
2
ESNR])dhnE
=
(
(1 + δn)e
δ′n
n
2e · Γ(n2 + 1)
2
n
)n
2
· · ·
· · · 2n2 (δ′′n+EHE [1+H2ESNR])
∫
P3n
ω(hnE)dh
n
E
=
(
n(1 + δn)e
δ′n
2e · Γ(n2 + 1)
2
n
)n
2
2
n
2 (δ
′′
n+EHE [1+H
2
ESNR])
Justification.
6) Due to the bounds of integration we know that every value
of he will satisfy the definition of P3n, thus it satisfies:
1
n
n∑
i=1
log(1 + h2E,iSNR)− EHE [1 +H2ESNR] ≤ δ′′n
⇒ 1
n
log
(
n∏
i=1
(1 + h2E,iSNR)
)
≤ δ′′n + EHE [1 +H2ESNR]
Multiplying by n and exponentiating both sides:
⇒
n∏
i=1
(1 + h2E,iSNR) ≤ 2n(δ
′′
n+EHE [1+H
2
ESNR])
⇒
n∏
i=1
√
(1 + h2E,iSNR) ≤ 2
n
2 (δ
′′
n+EHE [1+H
2
ESNR])
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Continuing from the last string of inequalities and equalities,
we take the logarithm of the beginning and end, and divide
by n:
Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn, HnT , HnE)
n
≤ 1
n
log
((1 + δn)eδ′n n
2e · Γ(n2 + 1)
2
n
)n
2
· · ·
· · · 2n2 (δ′′n+EHE [1+H2ESNR])

=
1
2
log
(
(1 + δn)e
δ′n
n
2e · Γ(n2 + 1)
2
n
)
+ · · ·
· · ·+ 1
2
(
δ′′n + EHE [1 +H
2
ESNR]
)
=
1
2
log
(
(1 + δn)e
δ′n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
+
1
2
log
(
n
2e · Γ(n2 + 1)
2
n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
+ · · ·
· · ·+ 1
2
(
δ′′n + EHE [1 +H
2
ESNR]
)
.
Let us see the asymptotic behavior of these first two terms.
A1. If we choose δn → 0 and δ′n → 0 as n → ∞ at rates
sufficiently slow (so as to allow 1−ǫ1n → 1 and 1−ǫ2n →
1 resp.), then A1→ 0 as n→∞.
A2. It can be shown that n
2e·Γ(n2 +1)
2
n
→ 1 as n→∞ so that
A2→ 0 as n→∞.
Since we can choose δn, δ
′
n, δ
′′
n in such a way so that δ
′′
n → 0
and ǫ1n, ǫ
2
n, ǫ
3
n → 0 as n → ∞, it follows that ǫn → 0 as
n→∞. Combing these previous steps yields our claim:
lim
n→∞
ǫ→0
Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn, HnT , HnE)
n
≤ 1
2
EHE
[
log(1 +H2ESNR)
]
.
Thus, we have completed the proof of Theorem 5. 
APPENDIX H
PARTIAL CSIT: PROOF OF LEMMA 9 AND THEOREM 6
In this final appendix, we shall prove results related to
partial CSIT. In particular, we will prove Lemma 9 (proves
that the sets we defined for partial CSIT are actually typical)
and Theorem 6 (another main result of our paper that proves
an upper bound on max-information in the the partial CSIT
scenario).
Proof of Lemma 9.
We first see that T ′ni is (1 − ǫni) typical directly from
Section VI-B. Then:
P [(Xn, HnT , H
n
E , Z
n) ∈ T ′n|Xn = xn]
= P
[
(Xn, HnT , H
n
E , Z
n) ∈ T ′n1 × · · · × T ′nd |Xn = xn
]
1≥ P [(Xn1 , Hn1T , Hn1E , Zn1) ∈ T ′n1 |Xn1 = xn1]+ · · ·
· · ·+ P [(Xnd , HndT , HndE , Znd) ∈ T ′nd |Xnd = xnd]− d+ 1
2≥
d∑
i=1
(1− ǫni)− d+ 1
= d− d+ 1−
d∑
i=1
ǫni
≥ 1− dǫ∗ (define ǫ∗ be the largest ǫni over all i).
Since ǫ∗ is going to 0 with n→∞ and we are free to choose
d, we see that T ′n is a (1− ǫn) typical set.
Justification.
1) Fre´chet inequality for Cartesian products.
2) We know that T ′ni is a (1− ǫni) typical set for all i thus:
P
[
(Xni , HniT , H
ni
E , Z
ni) ∈ T ′ni |Xni = xni
] ≥ 1− ǫni
and we sum over all i.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 9. 
Proof of Theorem 6
The proof follows in a similar fashion to both Lemma 2 and
Theorem 5.
2I
ǫ
∞
(Xn∧Zn,HnT ,H
n
E)
1≤ 2IT
′
n
∞ (X
n∧Zn,HnT ,H
n
E)
= EHnTHnE
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
ωT ′n(z
n|xn, HnT , HnE)dzn
= EHnTHnE
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
ω(zn|xn, HnT , HnE) · · ·
· · ·1((xn, HnT , zn) ∈ T ′n)dzn
=
∫
ω(hnT , h
n
E)
∫
Rn
max
xn∈Cn
ω(zn|xn, hnT , hnE) · · ·
· · ·1((xn, hnT , hnE , zn) ∈ T ′n)dzndhnTdhnE
2≤
∏
i
∫
ω(hniT , h
ni
E )
∫
Rni
max
xni∈C ini
ω(zni |xni , hniT , hniE ) · · ·
· · ·1((xni , hniT , hniE , zni) ∈ T ′ni)dznidhniT dhniE
(now let J = [hT,i, hT,i+1)ni × Rni+ )
3
=
∏
i
∫
J
ω(hniT , h
ni
E )
∫
Rni
max
xni∈C ini
ω(zni |xni , hniT , hniE ) · · ·
· · ·1((xni , hniT , hniE , zni) ∈ T ′ni)dznidhniT dhniE .
(19)
Justification.
1) T ′n is a (1 − ǫn) typical set; however, it may not be
the set corresponding to the “smallest” ǫ smooth max-
information.
2) We wish to integrate over all n and to do so, we break
up the integral into integrals over each ni.
a) Suppose Ni ≥ ni. In this case, we have transmitted
a full ni length codeword over the ith channel and
choose to not send information over the channel during
the remaining Ni − ni channel uses. Then:∫
RNi−ni
max
xNi−ni
ω(zNi−ni |xNi−ni , hNi−niT , hNi−niE )dzNi−ni
33
=
∫
RNi−ni
ω(zNi−ni |hNi−niT , hNi−niE )dzNi−ni
= 1.
Thus, if Ni ≥ ni ∀i then we obtain equality at this line.
b) Suppose Ni < ni. In this case, the ith channel did
not appear often enough for the transmitter to send
an entire ni length codeword. By not sending the
full codeword, we are inherently limiting the amount
of information sent across the channel and therefore
the amount of information that can be leaked to
the eavesdropper. Hence, sending the full ni length
codeword allows more information (or equal amount
of information) to be leaked to the eavesdropper and
therefore serves as an upper bound to the actual value.
More clearly:∫
RNi
ω(zNi|xNi , hNiT , hNiE ) · · ·
· · ·1((xNi , hNiT , hNiE , zNi) ∈ T ′Ni)dzNi
≤
∫
Rni
ω(zni|xni , hniT , hniE ) · · ·
· · ·1((xni , hniT , hniE , zni) ∈ T ′ni)dzni .
3) Due to the partitioning of the channel coefficients, we
know that for each i, HT ∈ [hT,i, hT,i+1).
Continuing on we have:
(19)
4
=
∏
i
EH
ni
e
∫
Rni
max
xni∈C ini
ωTni (z
ni |xni , Hnie )dzni
5
=
∏
i
2I
T
′
ni
∞ (X
ni∧Zni ,H
ni
T ,H
ni
E ).
Taking the logarithm of each side and dividing by n we
have:
Iǫ∞(X
n ∧ Zn, HnT , HnE)
n
≤ 1
n
log
(∏
i
2I
T ′ni
∞ (X
ni∧Zni ,H
ni
T ,H
ni
E )
)
=
1
n
∑
i
log
(
2I
T
′
ni
∞ (X
ni∧Zni ,H
ni
T ,H
ni
E )
)
6≤ 1
n
∑
i
ni
1
2
EHE
[
log
(
1 +H2E
γi(hT,i)
σ2E
)]
=
1
2n
∑
i
(pin− εi)EHE
[
log
(
1 +H2E
γi(hT,i)
σ2E
)]
=
1
2
∑
i
piEHE
[
log
(
1 +H2E
γi(hT,i)
σ2E
)]
+ · · ·
· · · − 1
2n
∑
i
εiEHE
[
log
(
1 +H2E
γi(hT,i)
σ2E
)]
7→ 1
2
EHE ,HT
[
log
(
1 +
γ(HT )H
2
E
σ2E
)]
,
as n→∞ and ǫ→ 0.
Justification.
4) We can split up the conditional density as
ω(zni |xni , hniT , hniE ) =
ω(zni , xni , hniE )ω(h
ni
T )
ω(xni , hniE )ω(h
ni
T )
= ω(zni |xni , hniE )
where the first equality follows from the fact that hniT
is independent of zni , xni , and hniE . Note that h
ni
T was
indeed used to determine which codebook to use on this
channel, but at this point that has been determined and
we have restricted the integration of hniT to take this
into account, i.e. xni is independent of hniT . Thus the
multiplicand becomes:∫
J
ω(hniE )ω(h
ni
T )
∫
Rni
max
xni∈C ini
ωT i(z
ni |xni , hniE )dznidhniE dhniT
=
∫
R
ni
+
ω(hniE )
∫
Rni
max
xni∈C ini
ωT i(z
ni |xni , hniE )dznidhniE .
The equality follows from the fact that we know hT ∈
[hT,i, hT,i+1) for each component of the ni length vector
for every i. Therefore integrating ω(hiT ) over the whole
space where hT is guaranteed to be will yield 1 for each
of the
∑
i ni integrals. We then rewrite the integral over
hniE in the form of expected value.
5) Definition of I
T ′ni
∞ (Xni ∧ Zni , HniT , HniE ) and Lemma 6.
6) Upper bound as found in Theorem 5.
7) d can be made arbitrarily large and thus the channel
coefficient intervals can be made arbitrarily small, hence
the convergence of the first term to the expected value.
For the second term:
lim
n→∞
1
2n
∑
i
εiEHE
[
log
(
1 +H2E
γi(hT,i)
σ2E
)]
= 0.
Since EHE
[
log
(
1 +H2E
γi(hT,i)
σ2E
)]
is constant with re-
spect to n and εi → 0. Also, δn, δ′n, δ′′n (from Theorem 1)
can be chosen in such a way that ǫ→ 0 as n→∞.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 6. 
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